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GAIUS GLENN ATKINS

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The Maze of the Nations

By

Gaius Glenn Atkins, D.D.

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Carnegie Church Peace Union Prize Essay

The Maze of the Nations

AND THE WAY OUT

By
GAIUS GLENN ATKINS
Minister of the Central Congregational Church, Providence

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Introduction

SINCE the Church Peace Union first asked that monographs on some aspect or other of world peace be submitted by the clergy of American churches the whole question of international peace has been called upon to adjust itself to the interposition of an immense fact—such an engagement of major European nations as has not been known since the time of Napoleon, and such a kind of war as the world has never known. The war of 1914 is a flaming bar of judgment before which, whether we will or no, we are all being summoned.

Our dominant forces and tendencies, the quality and power of our ideals, our social and governmental institutions, the very bases of society itself are all called to answer under a very ancient statute,—"By their fruits ye shall know them."

There is no great region of human interest where we can go on without taking into account what the war is teaching us. Least of all can we go on in our peace propaganda

without readjusting many of our conclusions, estimating anew the value of much upon which we have heretofore depended, and taking a new account of the potentiality of forces which only yesterday we fondly dreamed had well-nigh burned themselves out.

The first question which the advocates of peace as a world policy must ask themselves is, What is this present war teaching us, and what effect must it have upon our propaganda?

It is too soon to hope for any final answer to such questions as these, but some things are already beyond debate. Many of the arguments upon which the militarist has depended as he sought to secure popular approval for his programme have been shot to pieces.

This war is teaching us first of all that humanity has not lost its fighting edge. The hopes and fears of those who believed that our old fighting instincts were dead or so blunted as to have lost their primitive and terrible power are alike disappointed: we are offered from day to day proofs that men generally are capable of displaying a finer and more desperate kind of courage than ever before. If we are depending upon the decadence of the fighting spirit to secure international peace,

we are leaning upon a broken reed; and if, on the other hand, any of us, fearful of such decadence, have been justifying war as a kind of mighty and necessary testing in which from time to time courage, endurance and all such qualities must be tried out, we know now that there is no such basis for our fears.

We are being taught, militarists and pacifists alike, that modern warfare is wholly hostile to every other aspect of civilization. Nothing else can live on the soil which it occupies; fields are unploughed, ungathered harvests rot beneath the sky; famine walks through the streets of capital cities; and just as the wolves come out of their hidden fastnesses to follow the swaying fortunes of the armies, so those gaunt spectres which wait upon the dissolution of society press in by roads empty of happiness and hope. Universities close their doors, schools are dismissed, artists, poets and singers have only war for their theme, or else go out to lose themselves in the universal struggle. It is no longer possible to localize war; it requires states for its exercise and the long frontiers of the nations. Nothing remains in any land which its red tides overwhelm but such a desolation as passes imagination.

Elemental passions cannot be restrained; religion is made subservient to the spirit of militarism, and embattled nations seek to involve God Himself in their strife. In the light of such facts as these the propaganda for peace gains immeasurably in weight and significance. Those who dream that war is the handmaid of civilization and the vehicle of culture need only to look abroad to see how false their dreams have been.

If war were only an incident, if we could localize it or save out of the wreck of it some part at least of that which is dear to us either through the glory of its past or the promise of its future, we might be brought to endure war, even though we could not countenance it; but now that we see with terrible clearness how fundamentally hostile it is to every aspect of civilization save those efficiencies and darings which it does for the moment exalt, we are committed to a campaign against it which may not be given over until the very roots which nourish it are finally cut.[1]

[1] The conduct of the war since these paragraphs were first written (six months ago) has been one long demonstration of their truth. The submarine, the aeroplane, and the Zeppelin have no mercy for non-combatants. Such restraints as international law has hitherto been able to secure for the sake of humanity have broken down both on land and sea. Death

It is already demonstrated that militarism does not and cannot possibly ever secure or safeguard peace: there is no need to enlarge upon that just here—we shall come back to it again and again in the course of this study. It is enough to say now that history records no more stupendous failure than the failure of the immense and constantly expanding armament of our generation to do what its apologists have offered as their most conclusive argument for its existence; and that is to keep the peace.

There are some things also which the friends of peace must take into account. The present war is showing clearly the inadequacy of our whole peace programme up to this time. We have sought to secure peace on too easy terms. It has been a propaganda rather than an international policy—a sentiment rather than a procedure of statesmanship—a half held ideal rather than a burning conviction of the nations.

hides in hateful gases; there are rumours of poisoned waters. "Frightfulness" is the confessed method of one group of the embattled peoples. The nations are called upon to endure the slaughter of women and little children far from the battle lines. There are no localized battle lines. War is everywhere. They will win who can longest endure this universal dissemination of death and fear. Neutrality is increasingly difficult, and involves more subtle questions. Modern warfare is a maelstrom which sweeps everything into its gulf.

We have left out of account the forces which urge men to war and the deeper fact that the roots of these forces must be cut before war itself shall have ceased to be. We ought to see now through the smoke of battle as we have not clearly enough seen through the light of a misleading security that we are only to fully obtain peace through the profound readjustment of international conditions. For peace is not the mere cessation of warfare or sunny quiet or folded hands. It is no negative thing. Peace is the mightiest achievement of life, whether in the soul or in the state. It is the reconciliation of contending forces, the readjustment of disturbing conditions, the fusion of a thousand lesser things in a unity which possesses and orders them all. Peace in the soul is neither a serene carelessness nor a shallow trust. We are never at peace in our own lives until we have faced all our problems and found at least some hope of their solution, until we have set in order contending impulses, until we have heard and obeyed the voice of duty, until we have seen in what we cannot understand, the method of wisdom and love, until we have sought the enduring values and known ourselves to be in alliance with unseen and eternal forces.

Peace is the last achievement of life. Its clear light does not often begin fully to fall across the little landscape of our lives until our shadows begin to lengthen towards the east. Then from time to time we see the wonder of it upon the faces of our friends in a mystic light which witnesses that they have learned at last the meanings of life; have been taught what to keep and what to surrender; have learned to love, to trust and to wait. There is no other law for international peace. When we consider what it has cost to secure peace in our own states and cities, what it has cost to make us secure in our homes, to organize the machinery of the courts, the protecting discipline of the State and above all to establish the ideals and acquiescences which bind us together and how imperfect at the best it all is, and how even now the peace of the State is broken again and again, shall we wonder that we have not yet even begun to secure it in the wider relationships of the world?

Let us begin then by recognizing that peace has its price—that we shall never have it until we have paid that price, and that it is greater on the whole than we have yet begun to dream, just because peace itself is a far more difficult achievement than we have

heretofore recognized. So much the incessant roar of guns breaking in upon the quiet of our dreams is teaching us.

What our peace propaganda has heretofore been desirous of securing is the adjustment of strained relationships and that when the strain has almost reached the breaking point. We have counted more upon arbitration than anything else, and yet arbitration is at the best but a court of next to the last resort, to be appealed to only when the nations have come to the end of their ordinary diplomatic procedure. For the organization of the machinery of arbitration we are dependent upon the agreement of the nations; to put that machinery in action we are dependent upon treaties which must first define the subjects which may be arbitrated and then bind the contracting parties to submit such questions to arbitration. Now this is all a paper machinery. True enough, a "scrap of paper" which has the honour and good faith of the nations behind it is vastly more than a scrap of paper; it is the visible and evident sign of unseen realities, and the strength of it is not the tenacity of its cohering fibres, but the honour and good faith which drew and signed and sealed it. Nevertheless we are under bonds to recognize that treaties can be

broken, as well as made, and that there is a point beyond which no treaty ever drawn will hold in check the hopes and fears, the passions and ambitions of the nations. Up to a certain point we may control these elemental forces by international agreements, but beyond that point international agreement must be secured by the control of these deeper forces. If we do not master them they will master us. It is difficult to put all this in a sentence, but here nevertheless is the new task to which our passion for peace must address itself,—the elimination of the war-making forces; this, and nothing less than this, is the only sure guarantee of international peace. The peace problem and our health problem demand related solutions; sanitation, so we are coming to see with increasing clearness, is the price of health. Only as we clear up the soil in which disease roots itself are we absolutely sure of health—and this means the changing of a multitude of things—moral, social, economic;—dirt and poverty, folly and sin have all to be dealt with. But once we have cleared up this soil and secured normal and wholesome conditions of life, then, because God has made it so, health is blessed, immediate, automatic.

So with peace,—we shall secure peace

only through a long process of what President Jordan calls, "international sanitation." What measure of peace the world possesses or has possessed has been conditioned always by the way in which we have dealt with war-making forces. In the measure in which we have eliminated them we have had peace directly, automatically, immediately as light; in the measure that we have failed in fulfilling the conditions upon which peace depends, we have had war, and we would better confess that we have deserved it. Sometimes it has been the punishment for our sin, and sometimes an unspeakably bitter school to which we have been sent to be taught a rarer wisdom; but always it has been the flaming revelation of conditions which demand to be remedied.

Here, then, is the vaster task to which we must address ourselves,—the transformation of conditions, the elimination of forces making for war, and the substitution of attitudes and tempers automatically fruitful in peace for attitudes and tempers which issue directly in war and which we have heretofore been trying to restrain by treaties and conventions. Once the war state of mind prevails, restraining conventions and ideals perish with the temper which begot them. We must go deeper than we have yet gone.

It is much to have our civil courts where my neighbour and myself can adjust our differences; it is much better that we should refer them to the courts than that we should challenge one another to a duel, or array our households on opposite sides of a line and dare one another to fight; but what we really want is such a way of living together that we shall never need to go to court. Many of us have managed just that. Many men—most men—find it possible to conduct great businesses and never to carry a personal matter into the courts for adjustment. They have discovered that peace is not a way to settle quarrels but a way to avoid them, and that there are ways of conducting business and living in true neighbourliness which make the courts as unnecessary as the old gage of battle. They are glad to know that the courts are there—they use them in extremity, but only as a last expedient, to be avoided at any reasonable cost. So with arbitration. It would be foolish and ungracious to question the worth of it either as an actual force in the life of the nations or as a fine and compelling ideal. A world so complex as ours will always demand a high tribunal secured by consent and invested with solemn sanctions to which disputed questions can be re-

ferred for adjudication. The Palace of Peace in the shadow of the woods which girdle the Hague is a tremendous fact even to-day. It will be a mightier fact to our children's children. Chastened and repentant, nations will be seeking its doors again when this noise of guns is stilled. But arbitration alone is not equal to the task we have asked of it. There are, moreover, some things which cannot be arbitrated. You cannot arbitrate memories, passions and ambitions. You cannot arbitrate the scars of ancient wounds. There is no court of arbitration which can adjust between Germany and France the bitter recollection of two hundred and fifty years of mutual aggression. Germany will remember her desolated Rhine frontiers, the proud and cruel folly of Louis XIV ; she will remember Napoleon riding through the streets of her capital cities and insulting her queen. Who can arbitrate that? France will remember Bismarck's altered telegram, the siege of Paris, the disgrace of Gravelotte and Sedan. She will remember a German Emperor crowned in the palace of the French kings ; she will remember Alsace and Lorraine. Who can arbitrate these? When the streets of cities run high with the tides of passion, and kings are riding with their crowns for hazard, and nations

cast their destinies into the cauldron of war, arbitration is as powerless as a child's dyke of sand in the face of an angry sea. No, we must go deeper than that and seek in some way to stay these tides of passion before they have begun to rise; after that it is often too late.

This monograph, then, is an attempt to show that permanent international peace is possible only through the elimination of the causes of war. Arbitration and its kindred methods are at best but devices to carry us over acute crises and mitigate international jealousy. A wholly adequate peace programme must consider the causes of war, suggest the ways in which they can be eliminated, and above all, seek to commit the nations to their elimination. It goes without saying that this is the most massive task to which the moralist or the publicist can address himself; no monograph can do more than indicate and outline such a programme. The reader is therefore asked to judge what follows with a discriminating charity and to pass rather upon the soundness of the central contention than upon the detail of its development.

I

THE CAUSES OF WAR, HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED

IT is not easy to analyze the causes of war; for the most part a group of causes is responsible for every war. Nevertheless a survey of the field of history discloses certain outstanding forces which have entered either singly or in combination into every militant situation. We shall simplify our analysis by considering them one by one, always recognizing, however, that they rarely act alone, and that there is abundant room for difference of opinion as to the real cause of any war. Historians differ in their assignment of causes through their temper, their dominating philosophy of history and the direction of their sympathy. I think, however, that the causes which are now to be named are so salient as substantially to constitute the continuing historical war-making forces.

I. The first and most fundamental group of causes of war is economic. It is possible

that the economic interpretation of history is just now being overdone; for man does not live by bread alone, and it is difficult to find many wars into which other than economic conditions do not enter, but it is also difficult to discover in the long records of history very many wars in which economic conditions have not been either contributing or controlling causes. The simplest form in which economic stress expresses itself is the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence. There is a limit beyond which any territory will not support its inhabitants. This limit is immensely elastic; it is a question whether it has ever as yet been absolutely reached in any state. But that there is such a limit is the commonplace of political economists, and once a nation begins to press upon it, even remotely, that nation becomes a restless and dangerous neighbour. This sustaining limit is soonest reached by people whose methods of agriculture are crude and who depend largely for their means of livelihood upon the chase, and indeed upon predatory warfare. Without doubt it was in some such soil as this that warfare first rooted itself. Directly a tribe began to outpopulate its neighbours and to press sharply upon the limit of subsistence, then war offered itself as

the easiest way out. That tribe needed more land for its expanding population; those from whom it tried to take it naturally resisted, and so the fight was on. Many things beside mere growth in population may create or intensify such conditions; it is likely that such climatic changes in the interior of Asia as are witnessed by ruined cities overlaid by desert sands first compelled that tide of migration, old as the records of time and unresting in its operation, which has washed the shores of every land and stained every soil with the blood of those who opposed it. Much has been changed since then, but fundamental economic conditions have not altered. The pressure of population upon the means of livelihood has caused directly or indirectly more fighting than anything else. Tensions and restlessnesses so created express themselves in a constant land hunger which is, from an economic point of view, simply an excess of caution or foresight. It was instinctive to begin with. Even so late as the beginnings of British colonial extension, what made land hunger was felt rather than reasoned out. The virile races have always sought for themselves a margin of security; they have never been content to occupy simply enough territory for the time

being. In our own time land hunger has become conscious and acute; it understands itself and defends itself on the ground of economic necessity and this present war is in part simply the mighty and deferred expression of it. Europe has been saved ever since the discovery of America from the full development of situations which economists have always known to be resident in the life of humanity. Migration has been a kind of safety valve, preventing an explosion which might long ago have occurred. If European nations had been compelled in the last fifty years to retain within their own frontiers even a small proportion of those who have gone out to make homes for themselves in lands where they have been welcome for what they were and for what they brought, Western civilization would long ago have been face to face with a situation whose difficulty cannot easily be overemphasized. The more highly disciplined nations have of late grown unwilling to avail themselves of this safeguard. Migration always means that the citizen is lost to the land of his birth, and nations no longer take kindly to such a loss. Germany, for example, is not willing that her citizens should migrate to non-Germanic lands. They have been kept at home until

the margin of subsistence, pushed back as that margin has so long been by Germany's splendid scientific utilization of all her resources, has become almost a negligible quality. She is determined that when her citizens leave the Fatherland, they shall go only into territory owned and directed by Germany; and such territory can only be secured at the expense of other nations; she is fighting—so she says—for her place in the sun. If other nations are to insist upon the same thing, and are minded to back up their insistence in the same way, the future is dark indeed.

There is, moreover, a limit to those territories which may be occupied by migration, even without regard to national sovereignty. The far-sighted see along the horizons of the future the spectres of hunger and need. Here is one reason for an endless deal of fighting in the past and the dark, half-hidden cause of our fighting to-day. To the economic group of war-making forces belongs also the passion to control the more important and necessary natural resources. We have reason to believe that somewhere at the heart of the difficult situation in Mexico to-day is the determination of competitive groups to control the Mexican oil fields; England

fought the Dutch in South Africa for the control of the South African gold fields; the nations have been intriguing against one another in China in the hope of administering the Chinese iron and coal mines; and all this because petroleum and iron and gold and coal are absolutely essential to the conduct of our complex industrial life. A nation which controls great stores of raw material controls not only the present but the future.

Beyond all this is the fight for markets. The determination of England to keep open the Flemish markets for her wool runs clear through the tangled web of the Hundred Years' War. For two generations the West has been ready to fight for the markets of the Orient. England would spend her last sovereign and her last man in the defense of India,—not only for the pride of empire, but through the value of India as a market for English goods. And Germany herself seeks colonial expansion, not only that she may find a place where her children may make new homes for themselves under the flag of the Fatherland, but also because she is determined to get new markets for German-made goods.

Related to this central economic problem is the control of the seas. The mastery of

the sea means freedom of import and export. It means direct and indirect advantage in all trade competition. The loss of sea power is felt, first of all, in changed economic conditions. With negligible exceptions, any nation which has been able to keep her own trade routes open and to close the trade routes of her rivals has been able to dominate every situation and finally to win in every war.

What is true of the sea is true also of the land. As trade routes—whether by land or sea—have been gained or lost from the day of Tyre until our own time, states have grown rich or poor, cities have grown great or have waned, half forgotten, with only the memory of their former glory to lighten their deepening shadows. So with the cities of the Greek peninsula, so with Venice and Genoa, so with the cities of the Hanseatic League.

In our own time the operations of capitalism must be ranked among the war-making forces, for capitalism is at once the modern expression and the modern vehicle of economic necessities and ambitions. In any highly industrialized nation the government is the agent of the industrial and commercial forces of the nation. It is more than that, of course, but no government could long en-

dure which ran constantly counter to these great forces. The agents of the capitalist are the pioneers in economic expansion. The traders of the nations are the first to meet on debated frontiers or around coveted concessions. The diplomat follows the trader, and the soldier follows the diplomat. Capitalism has shown itself upon occasion strangely capricious in its patriotism—ready enough to create difficult situations, then demanding that the state back it up in what it has done solely for its own advantage. Capitalism is a state within the state. More than almost any force in the modern world it is wanting in sentiment and consideration. It is highly competitive ; it creates and complicates international tensions.

Here, then, is the first great group of war-making forces,—the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence, land hunger, desire for markets, the will to control trade routes both by sea and land, the purpose to control strategic groups of natural resources, and finally capitalism as the contemporaneous agent and expression of the whole group.

II. Ranking next to economic competition as a war-making force is imperialism. By imperialism I mean the more or less

clearly held ambition of any nation to dominate and administer other nations, whether of the same race or of other races, whether of relatively the same stage of culture or of a lower stage of culture and civilization. Imperialism aims at economic supremacy, just as it aims at political, racial and cultural supremacy—to that extent it is closely allied to the first group.

But there is this difference between such wars as have been caused by economic pressure alone or predominantly, and the wars of imperalism. Economic pressure is a driving force ; imperial ambition is a moving ideal. Once imperialism is fully in action it creates and releases forces which dominate the imagination. It is only when we are far enough away from the glory and wonder of a great empire to estimate the hidden and slowly maturing costs of it, that we really see how much the passion for empire has cost our race. Nothing, on the whole, has so mastered the imaginations of men as this same passion ; the very words by which we denominate it carry their own vast and awe-inspiring suggestions — "emperor," "empire," "imperial." How they lift themselves against all the horizons of the commonplace !

We are always wanting to transcend our-

selves—we children of time and clay; our restlessness and ambition are always calling us to deeds which we think worthy of our dreams. In some ways no human achievement seems more splendidly to justify us to ourselves than the creation and administration of a great empire. Empires express themselves in capitals made wonderful by the wealth of kings, beautiful by the creative power of artists and architects, and rich in the wealth of plundered people. Empires have never wanted their poets and their singers; empires drive their highways from the courtyards of their palaces to the far frontiers of the earth. Imperialism systematizes and organizes; it is unity as against division, too often efficiency as against inefficiency. Imperialism secures its own kind of peace. For centuries the *pax Romana* lay all across the Mediterranean world, and included in its broadening, reconciling unity the Occident, the Orient and a hundred subject peoples. England substituted an ordered administration for the endless fighting and plundering which had so largely constituted the history of India, down to the time of the British occupation.

But we recognize clearly enough when we stand far enough back from it all that im-

perialism with its ambitions has been the cause of endless fighting. No empire has ever been established save by the sword; by the sword alone empire is maintained, and hitherto at the edge of the sword empire has always perished. For no empire can be built up except at the cost of what is, potentially at least, the most precious thing in the world, and that is the individuality of nations and the integrity of races. Nothing is so certain as this; the flaming witness of history is against the empire builder. The jackal prowls and the night-bird calls across the desolation where the rulers of Nineveh and Babylon once built their palaces and told on sculptured stone the story of their cruel victories. Tyre is a bare and sea-washed rock, nothing remains of imperial Egypt but the tombs of her kings; the protests and judgments of Israel's prophets alone endure out of all the empire building of the valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates. We remember Greece for her vision, not her conquests. Rome, the mightiest fact in imperial history, could not withstand the forces which tended to undo her, and since the fall of that empire all lesser empires have been but the creations of a day. The empire of Charlemagne barely outlived its founder. The fiction of the Holy

Roman Empire deflected the true course of German and Italian history for almost a thousand years; the Napoleonic empire endured only from Austerlitz to Waterloo, and what is really enduring in the British empire will eventually be seen to be the genius of the English for colonization and for the really sacrificial administration of races not in subjection, but in tutelage. From first to last every empire in history has been undone by the deathless instinct of race. The blood of the conquered is a poor cement. Naturally the races marked for destruction or absorption have first protested and then resisted. Where they have finally been slain they have, like Banquo's ghost, haunted the palaces of those who slew them; where they have been wholly subjected, they have struggled on in their bonds, always rebellious, always a source of weakness in the imperial fabric,—often in the end to reassert themselves and build their life anew upon the foundations of the ruined world-state, or else if they could do no better, to pull down the columns of the edifice which had sought to shelter them, involving that and themselves in one common ruin.

Imperialism meant war even in earlier times, when the pride and instinct of race were not so inbred, and when world condi-

tions were comparatively fluid. To-day imperialism is an anachronism; everything is against it. Even between the East and the West there is no such inequality of social, political and cultural conditions as once seemed to divide the world into supreme and subject races. The very lengthening of history has deepened the consciousness of the peoples. World empire to-day can only be attained by struggles alongside which the fighting of an earlier time is but the disagreement of children. We shall not have world peace until imperialism is dead—until we have found some better way of expression for the idealism of which it has so long been the symbol.

III. A third cause of war has been the ambitions and jealousies of reigning houses. Dynastic wars have commonly had their economic aspects and they cannot be always differentiated from imperialism and its works, but none the less here is a cause apart. It is not so much in action to-day as before the French Revolution, but it is not wholly wanting in the complex of causes responsible for the present European war. How long dynastic forces have been in operation it would not be easy to say; Egyptian history is but

the record of the rise and fall of dynasties; every dynasty won its place by the sword, and failed through its power to maintain itself in the face of the challenge of rival groups. Assyrian and Babylonian history show exactly the same characteristics; in fact, Oriental wars have been on the whole more largely dynastic than Occidental. It is, of course, impossible to separate a reigning house from the manifold aspects of its epoch, or the manifold interests of the nation over which it reigns. The action and interaction of nation and dynasty is one of the most fascinating historical problems—a problem which has not on the whole received the attention which it deserves at the hands of historians. We Americans, with our democratic temper and traditions, are apt to underestimate such identification. Without much doubt national tempers and characteristics reveal themselves in their reigning houses; equally without doubt the temper and character of reigning houses react upon the idealism of the subject nation and give it a quality which it would not otherwise possess. But it is still true that once a dynasty is established, family interests, apart from the welfare of the nation as a whole, play a large part in the direction of diplomacy and the

whole conduct of the nation's foreign relations. A reigning house defines the well-being of the state in its own prosperity, rather than its own well-being in the prosperity of the state. Members of the family have to be provided for, marriages arranged, alliances secured, and above all and at any cost, the succession of the dynasty must be safeguarded.

Historically the involved processes of mediæval history and the mighty readjustments of the Reformation culminated in the establishment of three reigning groups, whose action and interaction dominate European history from the end of the sixteenth century until the time of Napoleon—The Bourbons in France, the Hapsburgs in Austria and, last in the field, the Hohenzollerns in Prussia, and the history of their relations is for the most part written in red. We cannot easily disengage, I repeat, the interests of France and Spain, Austria and Germany from the fortunes of their reigning houses. But it is beyond debate that for more than a hundred and fifty years their dynastic ambitions gave to European history a tragic and sinister quality. The pride and jealousy of kings bled the nations white. The wars of Louis XIV, the wars of the Spanish and Austrian succes-

sions, in fact all that endless fighting which filled substantially the whole of the eighteenth century was rooted in dynastic soil; and no wars have been more hateful or more sterile than such wars as these.

Through the extension of democracy and the growth of a national self-consciousness which contemplates the state apart from its kings, such controversies have largely spent their force and yet what they stood for and what they sought are still in action. The determination of modern Europe to maintain the balance of power is our nineteenth and twentieth century equivalent of the diplomacy and fighting of the period of dynastic wars. Europe has been made in part by its physical geography and in part by its racial strains; the interaction of race and geography has created a group of nations having common traditions of civilization and Christianity and yet separated by characteristics which the centuries have intensified rather than diminished. And these centuries have, through their long travail, worked out an equilibrium of which Europe is intensely jealous, and that for the best reason in the world, for this equilibrium cannot be substantially disturbed without crowding either a nation or a group of nations off the stage,

or else reducing them from their high estate. The balance of power and the integrity of European national life as now constituted are tied up in one bundle. No one can thoughtfully study a relief map of Europe with the massive facts of European history in mind, without being subdued and awed by the intensity of the contending forces which have moved upon that marvellous stage, without recognizing how easily their mutual poise may be disturbed, without wondering at the endless recrudescence of passions and ambitions which seem incapable of either learning or forgetting anything, and without recognizing that somewhere at the heart of the endless struggle which so passes in review before him, has been the determination of each nation to save its own life at whatever cost. The maintenance of the balance of power is the instinctive demand of immemorial racial instincts that what is rooted in such memories and has been maintained at such immense cost of blood and treasure, be not disturbed. The instinct to maintain and the instinct to attack the balance of European power are equally tenacious. Since the end of the mediæval period and the full emergence of a clearly defined group of European nations upon the field of history

no nation has attained a dominant status in either wealth, population or efficient organization without beginning to deal arbitrarily with weaker nations and to exploit every opportunity for conquest. In every instance this growing, challenging power has had to face first the fear, then the suspicion, and at last the organized hostility of those whom it threatened.

France was the first of the great European nations to become an international peril. This was due to the constructive and clearly defined force of the early French monarchy and the substantial homogeneity of the French race. France has never been able to aggrandize herself, permanently at least, at the expense of either Italy or Spain, and that for geographical reasons which need not be enlarged upon. But the Low Countries and the Rhine country generally have always mightily appealed to the French passion for empire. It is the fortune or misfortune of Europe that racial and physical geography do not run parallel; France would naturally be bounded by the Alps, the Pyrenees, the sea and the Rhine, but the Germans have so established themselves on the south of the Rhine, the Belgians, the Walloons and the Dutch in the delta of the Rhine, that France

has never been able to succeed in her almost age-long ambition to attain her natural frontiers. Every attempt she has made to do it has challenged races whose persistence of defense and whose capacity to reaffirm their racial integrity again and again after seemingly hopeless defeat, is one of the most striking features in the whole long story of European relationships. Republican France recognizes this and has turned to North Africa instead.

Across the Channel, England is by every interest a part of the European Concert and yet, by the fortune of her narrow seas, hitherto so isolated from it all as to be able to maintain a policy of mixed independence and interference. Her policy has been to play one European group against another. Here we have the key to the combinations of English, Dutch and Germans against which Louis XIV threw in vain the whole gallant might of France; here we have the key to those alliances which, more largely at the suggestion of England than of any other single power, were framed to meet the menace of Napoleon. Generally speaking we have in the endeavour to maintain the balance of power, the key to substantially the whole course of European diplomacy, from Napoleon to our own time; successive

alliances, that is, constantly directed towards the dominant state or states.

Now these alliances have without exception either eventuated in war or in unendurable states of armed tension. No one of them has ever been permanent. They have given the character of a dissolving panorama to Occidental diplomacy. They have made the foes of one great period of warfare the comrades of the next. They have united England and Germany against France, just as they are to-day uniting England and France against Germany. Within two decades we have seen Russia and Japan at war and Russia and Japan virtually fighting side by side. Lesser racial interests, particularly in Poland and the Balkans, have been constantly subordinated to the supposititious interests of these jealous groups.

Questions which ought long ago to have been settled have thus been left open,—the running sore of Turkey, for example—to plague from generation to generation those who had not unity enough of vision or power enough of moral purpose to deal with them in any wise or finally healing fashion.

No alliance can possibly be created which will secure to any European nation or group of nations a portentous or dictatorial su-

premacy. In the face of any force which threatens the racial and national integrity of the European group, the most carefully drawn treaty, however signed and sanctioned, will prove in the end nothing more than "a scrap of paper."[1] New combinations will take form; nations thought to have been hopelessly defeated will rise from their ashes, and every new-born imperialism will find itself face to face first with hatred, then with defiance, then with a cordon of steel.

If the history of Europe since Louis XIV has proved anything, it has proved that Europe will always find a way to meet force with force, oppose group to group and checkmate any predominant power, no matter how seemingly secure, by another combination strong enough at least to fight it to a standstill; but how much this has cost Europe it is not easy to say. If the larger ends which the endless fighting for the balance of power contemplates cannot be secured otherwise than by creating and dissolving allied groups and by the endless appeal to the arbitrament of arms, we who are glad to be known and, if need be, to be scorned as pacifists, can see little in the future to give substance to the body of our dreams.

[1] Witness the action of Italy since this was written.

IV. Still another cause of war, much more in evidence three hundred years ago than now, but by no means wholly to be disregarded even in our own time, is religious intolerance. It is a strange commentary upon our perverse human nature that what ought to unite us has so often divided us, and what ought to be supremely fruitful in love and forbearance has too often been tragically fruitful in bloody hatreds. Whatever we greatly care for strikes its roots deeply into our souls, fills all our horizons and makes it impossible for us to conceive of sincere and worthy men as rightfully caring for anything else. More than that, the fine qualities of life, when they go wrong, go bitterly wrong. This is beyond doubt the reason why family differences are so hard to adjust, and this too is the reason why religious passions, once deeply stirred, break into so deadly a flame. Christendom has had wars of religious intolerance enough, but has had by no means a monopoly in this doubtful field. Mohammedan and Hindu have long been at swords' points in India ; Mohammedanism has largely established itself by power of the sword, and even as this is being written, Mohammedan forces throughout the world are being summoned to a holy war.

With the growth of tolerance this cause has largely spent its force, but the possibility of its recrudescence is always to be taken into account. We have only to consider certain aspects of the feeling between Protestant and Catholic here in the United States to see that beneath the surface of society fires are still smouldering which could upon occasion be blown into flame.

V. A nobler cause of war is that passion for liberty which has again and again armed men and sent them out to such struggles as even a lover of peace may glory in. If there are always in action in this difficult world of ours ambitions, tempers and policies which seek to exploit themselves at the cost of other men, taking no account of racial aspirations, national idealisms and the longings of the individual soul, there is always, on the other hand, the deep and God-implanted passion of men to be free, to clear themselves of traditions, administrations, spiritual and governmental methods which halt them in their march to better things and stifle the expression of qualities which they instinctively know to be necessary to their well-being.

We have not always seen clearly enough in what disciplines and obediences true free-

dom is really established ; we have too often sought to be free before we were really fit to be free. A noble manifestation whether of a free state or a free soul must stand forever alongside righteous peace, they two

> " The one far-off divine event
> Towards which the whole creation moves."

The abuse of freedom has given those who condemn it occasion enough for scorn and misrepresentation and there will always be those who, through training or temperament, exalt order and discipline at the expense of freedom and self-expression. Very likely we need these apologists of discipline and restraint just as we need the protagonists of liberty. It is out of their action and interaction that the progress of the world is born.

But when all is said and done, we are under bonds to recognize that institutions tend to harden down. Established authorities, if not constantly corrected, lose their sense of the unresting and fluid movements of the human spirit, and are constantly setting up barriers which as constantly need to be overthrown and overpassed if the future is to have its way. So our world being what it is, we see how necessary it has been for liberty again and again to make its way with

the sword. Religious wars are always quite as truly wars for religious freedom as wars of religious intolerance; a good part of all that fighting which we owe to imperialism is only the noble and saving resistance of those who refuse to be imperialized. It is not too much to say that there is no real freedom to-day, whether in the administration of the state, in the worship of God, or in the operation of democracy itself, which has not been won by fighting. The measure of religious tolerance which holds in Europe to-day was, to begin with, at least, won by the sword; at the edge of the sword Holland cut herself free from Spain; at the edge of the sword the "divine right of kings" was hopelessly and finally beaten down on English soil; at the edge of the sword the better part of the French Revolution got room and a chance for life; at the edge of the sword the American colonies freed themselves from their over-zealous mother; at the edge of the sword slavery in America was ended and paid for; and no prophet is wise enough to say that this long and heroic chapter in the history of humanity is finally closed. We need to recognize, of course, as has been said again and again, that other causes have entered into and complicated every fight for liberty.

It is also an open question whether with a little more patience and long-suffering, many of the triumphs which have cost us so much might not have been secured peacefully, and whether a liberty which has been won by the sword has not in more cases than one lost something of its fine idealism and its glowing power through the very circumstances under which it had to be secured.

But however all this may be, our passion for liberty has been one of the great historic causes of war; and it is likely still to be, if we cannot find for it some better road to its goal than the mire of trampled battle-fields.

VI. We cannot dismiss the causes of war without considering also our natural love of fighting. How deeply rooted this is in our human nature we confess alike with sorrow and with pride,—with sorrow because it has again and again made us so blind to better things, so brutal in our hatreds, so terribly swift in our appeal to the sword, so impatient of braver and truer ways of settling our questions. It is part of our brute inheritance, and we shall be long in casting it off. It calls to us in the drum and the fife and the blare of martial music; it stirs us strangely as we listen to the sound of marching feet;

it moves like a fire in our veins when causes we love and honour are threatened or insulted; it drives youth towards the battlefield without regard to the causes which are there contended for; it is a distorting mist through which we see so much that we sadly need to see in a clearer and happier light. It is our pride because it testifies to the very greatest qualities of life, to the temper which holds life cheap when vaster interests are assailed, to our scorn of ease and inglorious days, to our contempt, when once fully aroused, of any kind of hardship or suffering. It would be a sad day for humanity if we should lose such qualities as these. Those of us who are most eager for world peace would be sorely troubled if we thought for a moment that peace meant the deterioration of human nature or the gradual wearing away of such high qualities as have again and again lifted life from its commonplace levels to those rare altitudes which are our glory.

No, it is not with the martial spirit that we quarrel, but rather with such revelations and employments of it as we have heretofore found for it. We shall come back to all this again; it is enough to say here that our natural love for fighting is an age-old cause of war.

VII. Finally, there are two dominating causes of war which are just now immensely in evidence—a false philosophy of life and militarism. They are wholly interrelated and they may be briefly defined as war come to consciousness and justifying itself as an adjunct of civilization. As we cast back over the centuries, we see that the materials for a philosophy which defends and exalts war have never been wanting, although almost until within our own time such a philosophy has lacked organic form. It has been left to the nineteenth century to sanction in the name of philosophy tempers and instincts which have been implicit in every fight since fighting first began, and not only to generalize and formulate them, but to exalt and defend and finally offer them as the last guiding principle of human life. Before militarism could become a philosophy, it needed some generally accepted principle in which to establish itself, the sanction of an authority almost cosmic in its reach. Charles Darwin, father of many things which he had no expectation of fathering, supplied the justifying principle. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest is always very grateful to those who think of themselves as belonging to the prevailing class: it is never so

grateful to those who go down in the fight. It is in entire accord with the fierce instincts of what the apostle Paul would call "the natural man." The doctrine suited itself marvellously to the prevailing economic and social theories of the last century. Laisser-faire in economy is the equivalent of the survival of the fittest in biology; the ideal of the competitive state which was the ideal of the political economists of the Victorian epoch marched gladly to the music which Charles Darwin's great formula supplied.

It was left to the strange, half-mad genius, Nietzsche, to carry to a portentous conclusion the implications of evolution as defined by Darwin, and more especially by the semi-materialistic philosophical scientists who succeeded him. Nietzsche discerned very clearly the fundamental antagonism between certain aspects of evolution and the gentleness, forbearance and self-sacrificing idealisms of the Gospel. He conceived the ideal of the superman as the end of the evolutionary process; he was not afraid to defend those qualities of ruthless self-affirmation through which he conceived the superman was to prevail, and to secure for it all a sort of cosmic sanction. Indeed he did more than that: he was poet enough and prophet

enough to invest it all with a spiritual atmosphere, and to make of the new gospel of superman a kind of religion, vastly more grateful to the temper of his time, and especially to the temper of his countrymen, than the hallowed gospel of the Nazarene.

"Ye have heard how in old time it was said, Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth; but I say unto you, Blessed are the valiant, for they shall make the earth their throne. And ye have heard men say, Blessed are the poor in spirit; but I say unto you, Blessed are the great in soul and the free in spirit, for they shall enter into Valhalla. And ye have heard men say, Blessed are the peacemakers; but I say unto you, Blessed are the war-makers; for they shall be called, if not the children of Jahve, the children of Odin, who is greater than Jahve." So Cramb summarizes for us the Beatitudes of Nietzsche's Gospel.

In France or England or America, Nietzsche would probably have been impossible, or at any rate his sowing would have fallen on stony soil; but there was much in contemporary Germany which received and approved the whole Nietzschean philosophy and even carried it into regions which Nietzsche himself did not anticipate. It is

only fair to say that he looked with real disfavour upon the application which many of his countrymen were making of his teachings. It is also only fair to say that there is a really profound and stimulating truth in Nietzsche's philosophy; the fault of it is not so much in the conception of the superman as in his misapprehension of what the superman is really to be, and in his more tragic misapprehension of the methods by which the superman is to prevail. There is much in it all which might well be taken up by the protagonists of the life of the Spirit, and much that reinforces their own contentions; but it is part of the tragedy of things that his philosophy appealed directly to the expanding of self-consciousness of the German people, vindicated them, as they thought, in their extraordinarily well-conceived and ruthlessly applied policy of international competition, and was made to justify excessive armaments as a part of the necessary machinery of the supernation.

This whole philosophy of life extended itself to many regions and became the working philosophy of men who had never heard of Nietzsche or his school, and who perhaps would have been the first to disclaim the very logic in answer to which they were

shaping their lives. A brilliant German historian, Treitske, mediated between Nietzsche and the university life of the Fatherland, and their joint effort has gone far towards sowing the soil of Europe with the seed of death.

The shock of arms is leading us to take account of forces which even those who are in the grip of them have heretofore inclined to scorn. Philosophies and idealisms seemed so far from the man in the street that we were not able to get him to take any interest either in his own idealisms or the idealisms of his world; and now it has suddenly and almost blindingly made manifest to him that idealisms are capable of mobilizing armies, of being cast into howitzers, of spreading abroad in endless ranks of armed men, and of filling earth and sky with their turmoil. The philosophy of force is the more dangerous because it is so insidious; it is a philosophy of half truth and insufficient insight. It is true in so far as it affirms the right of the fit to rule; it is false in that it so sadly fails to define rightly the terms which it employs. We shall need to postpone the consideration of this to a later section of this study, but we must recognize at the same time that when a Bernhardi contends that the might which makes

right is rooted in the whole complex discipline of a nation's life, in efficiency and restraint, in obedience and cleanliness of life, he is dealing with the obverse of a truth to which no nation ought to be blind.

War is, after all, a searching test of many great qualities in a nation's life. The pity of it all is that the apologists of force cannot see any better employment for qualities so admirable than war itself. What we need sorely is a new sense of the ends to which national discipline and efficiency must be addressed, the finer ways in which they may express themselves. Akin to all this way of thinking is our unwillingness to trust the higher forces,—patience, forbearance, justice and brotherhood. The dominant philosophies of militarism create an immense force which they put at the service of impatience, intolerance, prejudice and hatred, and above all at the service of an unwillingness to see complex situations through other men's eyes. An overgrown national self-consciousness, a hard and unyielding national temper, pride, the scorn of one's foes and the lack of consideration for one's neighbours are really the ultimate war-making forces; and when they are reinforced by such a philosophy as we have been considering, and are backed by an

iron national discipline, they constitute the greatest menace to the peace of the world.

VIII. Now militarism is the concrete expression of all this. I do not confuse the valour of the soldier and the deathless devotion of those who die for their country with militarism; militarism is another thing. It is the deification of force; it is the organization of pride and intolerance into corps, brigades and divisions; it is unbrotherliness cast into cannon; it is the scorn of forbearance, gentleness and patience, "writ in rows of burnished steel"; it intensifies the very tempers which have created it; it blinds us to the forces and influences to which, at the best, we are far too blind; it creates a great machinery which has no reason for being except as it is put into action, and it begets therefore an impatience for military action which inevitably flames into war; it seeks occasion for its exercise; it creates great vested interests whose prosperity depends wholly upon war or upon the continuous preparation for war. It has its lobbyists ready to do their insidious work in Congress or Parliament or Reichstag, veiling their selfish ends behind specious pleas of national necessity. It must foment national jealousies and emphasize the tension

of existing situations. It creates Yellow perils, Pan-Slavic perils and Pan-Germanic perils that the representatives of the people may be frightened into new orders for ships and arms. Militarism creates general staffs and bureaucracies whose whole business is naturally to exalt their own trade, magnify its importance and secure opportunities for its exercise. Militarism pretends to be a safeguard when it really increases the perils which it offers as the excuse of its existence and its operation. Militarism offers itself as a fire-extinguishing apparatus; in reality it saturates the houses of the nations with inflammable material and builds powder magazines which any spark may explode.

The magnificence of it captures our imagination, its splendid organization moves us to admiration, and because it offers so manifest a revelation of the power and wealth of the nations, it makes us drunk with its glory and its pride.

Militarism even pretends to be the protagonist of peace. Its apologists tell us that armies and navies are a sort of national insurance—that they are the true peacemakers. These—the apologists—do not seek indeed wholly to emasculate the Beatitudes; they are not willing to say, "Blessed are the war-

makers, for they shall be called the children of God," but they bring the peacemakers to us in strange guises. They would persuade us that superdreadnoughts and machine guns and siege cannon and armed hosts are what the Master really had in mind when He disclosed to man the true secret of blessedness. They justify their constant demand for increased armament by the precarious condition in which international peace would be left unless the nations were armed to the teeth. They do not dare to invoke the terrible presence of war to set the seal of approbation upon their programme; they ask instead that peace should stand sponsor for what they are wanting the nations to do. The position of the militarist for the last two or three decades has been fundamentally contradictory. He has come to us with the voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau. He has been constantly appealing to militant passions, while protesting that he does it all for the sake of peace.

Now there is a certain element of truth in his contentions. If might is to make right, and nations are to keep their place by the terror which they inspire, and international order is to be nothing better than an equilibrium of enmity, jealousy and mutual suspicion, backed up by substantially equal arma-

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ments on land and sea, and maintained by the really cowardly unwillingness of great states to use the armies and navies they have created, then armaments are the ministers of peace.

But such a world is impossible. There is a point beyond which caution and diplomacy cannot restrain the forces which militarism brings into being and the nations will take to honest fighting as wholly preferable to the nightmare of fear in which they have been living.

All this is so self-evident that it is hard to realize now that any one could ever persuade himself that it could be different; competition in armament may postpone the inevitable, but on the other hand it intensifies the terrible quality of the struggle which is bound sooner or later to come. Continued and excessive preparation for war must inevitably create a warlike temper. The situation in which Europe finds itself to-day is simply the culmination of certain states of mind which have been in gestation since the Franco-Prussian War. Psychological elements, which the historians have not generally considered as clearly as they might, have entered into every war, but more than any war in history this present war is psychological: it is the

creature of doubts and fears and shadowy hallucinations. It has been fathered by extremists and alarmists and the apostles of force and fear,—the Pan-German, Pan-Slav, the English imperialist, the French Chauvinist, and now the militarist has given form and body to this nightmare of the nations. Without him, Europe might at least have awakened to the clear light of brotherhood and truth, without being called to wade through blood to the day of her better insight. But he has incorporated such tempers and tendencies as these in a vast, dread machinery, the existence of which he has justified by his own unhappy or distraught dreams, and his armies and navies have in turn intensified the forces which begat them. "Surely," the world has been saying, "all these things which we fear must be true, because our armed forces are their witnesses. They are no dream; they are militant realities. The earth is beginning to tremble to their tread." To justify its own extravagance in the matter of armament each nation has been compelled to indict its neighbours. Every increased demand for naval armament submitted to the German Reichstag has been justified by the naval programme of England. Germany has thus been taught to fear and distrust the English

people. Every new naval budget submitted to Parliament has been justified by what Germany has been doing. So England has been taught to fear and distrust the German people; France and Germany have been trained to hate each other by exactly the same arguments. The shadow of Russia has lain heavily along the western horizon of the Fatherland while Russia has found in the massive armament of Germany the justification of the crushing burden which she has been asking her own patient and long-suffering people to bear. There has been for thirty years but one issue for such conditions as these, and that issue is now upon us. The man, who is able to believe that the creation of national tempers increasingly pregnant with the possibility of colossal strife is any real preparation for peace, has a strange kind of mind. The historian of the future, who casts up the accounts of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, will find many things that puzzle him, but nothing stranger than this deep-rooted persuasion that such preparations as have eventuated in the most colossal explosion of history were really the necessary servants of the peace of the nations.

Here, then, is a summary of the causes of

war. They are economic, they are resident in imperial ambitions and policies; they grow out of dynastic jealousies, religious and governmental intolerance and the opposing desire for liberty, love of fighting, false philosophies of life, militarism itself. They begin their work by creating strained international situations, they continue it by offering wrong solutions or inadequate solutions for such problems, and they end it by furnishing the organization, the machinery and the passion for war. Since the morning of history, humanity has lain in the grip of such forces as these. So far as any one of them has been eliminated through a truer national vision, a wiser national procedure or a worthier national spirit, the world has entered into peace with a blessed automatic directness which is at once the prophecy of better things to come and the indication of the roads by which a better order is to be reached.

II

THE ELIMINATION OF THE CAUSES OF WAR

LET us now approach these fundamental causes already enumerated from another point of view and consider just what we need to do to finally eliminate them. I do not need to say that any suggestions which one may offer here are of the most general character; nevertheless there are certain things so clear that we cannot help seeing them—contours of massive principles and policies in the final achievement of which this troubled world of ours is to find its peace. They lie all along the horizons of our economic, social, political, scientific, ethical, diplomatic and religious life; in some regions they are clouded, in other regions they are reasonably clear. Everywhere we are so far from reaching them that their details are lost, and between us and their full attainment there lies, it may be, more than one generation of painful endeavour; but none the less the contours are there. And if we face in their direction,—if

we do not allow ourselves to lose sight of their shining and commanding summits, if we press towards them as rapidly and as bravely as we may, we shall not in the end fail of attaining them.

I. The economic causes of war, since they are most fundamental and most constant, will be the most difficult to dispose of. They complicate every situation and are most insistent in their demands. We shall eliminate them by the joint force of the normal operations of industry and commerce, and the substitution of true economic ideals for false and misleading contentions. Thoughtful men have long believed that industry and commerce with their attendant fundamental necessities were so uniting the nations that they would be in themselves sufficient to prevent war.

This has been the contention of Mr. Norman Angell, who has shown us with convincing clarity that commerce no longer knows international frontiers. We have been gradually creating a new world of industrial relations and necessities which cannot for a moment be geographically defined. Industrial Germany interpenetrates industrial France; commercial England is one of the

many aspects of commercial America; finance is international. For such reasons as these we had hoped that here were forces already in action which would lend strength to every appeal for arbitration, delay hostilities and convince the nations of the substantial identity of their interests. The present war has done much to prove, nothing to disprove, this contention. We have had abundant demonstration of our interrelationships. The industries of the world were the first to feel the paralyzing touch of war.[1] One of the professed causes of the present conflict is the furtherance of the industrial well-being of the nations involved. When the war is over, nothing of the sort will have been accomplished; rather, the laborious and painstaking effort of generations will have been undone, and the great work will be all to begin again in the face of jealousies and embittered memories, with ruined factories, dislocated trade connections, and a prodigal waste of resource which has already made the world poor and will keep it poor for years.

[1] Signs are not wanting as this is being revised (June 1915) that the European governments are beginning to feel the pressure of industrial and commercial interests urging them towards peace.

It is too late to undo the past, but we ought to profit by all this in the future. We have before us a flaming demonstration, so written that those who run may read, that we are wholly on the wrong track if we believe that any economic problem whatever can finally be solved by force. Trade and industry have their own laws, their own armament and their own safeguards. They are most enduringly established not in the hostility and jealousy of the nations, but in their coöperation. The basis of all profitable trade is mutual service; gain must be shared or else there will presently be no gain. Trade follows the flag only in so far as new channels are thus cleared for it and intercourse is facilitated. Trade cannot be driven anywhere; it follows irresistibly the great lines of mutual well-being. The very word "trade" means the willing coöperation of two parties, and no amount of fighting can ever make it mean anything else. The great trade-making forces are honesty, fair dealing, technical skill, knowledge of markets, knowledge of human needs, and above all, international confidence and intercourse. War does not further them; it only supplants and destroys them. There is a place in any exhaustive consideration of the economic causes of war for a thorough-

going and impartial study of the relation of tariff legislation to international tensions. On the whole, the freer course we give to trade, the more likely it is to bind the nations together. It is too much to hope that the nations will be willing to abolish their tariffs, but it is an open question whether excessive tariffs have not tended on the whole to hamper the true development of the nations that have clung to them most faithfully, as well as to create international jealousies and diplomatic tensions which have resulted more than once in tariff wars that might themselves have been easily carried over into real war, and it is beyond debate that preferential tariffs are patent mischief-makers.

As we cast up the economic accounts of the past, we see that always and everywhere the liberation of trade has meant the increasing brotherhood of the peoples, and has released mighty and continuing peacemaking forces. There are indeed ways in which a state may foster its industrial development, but that may best be done by studying efficiency, by scientific utilization of natural resources, by careful technical education and by such development of the full wealth-producing capacity of the state, as will not only enable it to hold its own in the face of the

world's competition, but to contribute its distinctive part to the world's wealth.

The contention that markets are to be gained by fighting is an economic fallacy; the only markets which could possibly justify the cost of armed monopoly are markets in which, through this or that circumstance, unreasonable profits are possible. Markets in which conscienceless traders can exchange beads for ivory or muskets for gold may possibly be worth fighting for; but such markets as these are becoming, and ought to become, fewer and fewer. If they exist at all, they will soon utterly disappear; no nation can now gain a monopoly of any unduly profitable trade except at a cost which far outweighs any possible gain. Normal markets do not need to be fought for; they are gained and kept by the operation of purely industrial and economic forces.

Capitalism must be taught responsibility and be made subservient to the commonwealth. Its interests are not supreme, they must not be made supreme. The fallacy that trade can be furthered by fighting is bad enough; the temper which is willing to fight for trade is immensely worse. Dividends are desirable enough and commercial

enterprise is admirable enough, but we are coming clearly to see in our industrial development here in America that dividends which are paid out of poverty and dwarfed childhood and the honour of women are indefensible and that commercial enterprise ends where human well-being begins. So in the vaster world of trade: war made at the bidding of liberty is holy, but war made at the bidding of greed is so shameful as to be beyond defense. Its gains will be hateful with blood which no success can sweeten and which will "the multitudinous seas incarnadine." We may well look to these social forces now working beneath the surface in every great nation to restrain the malign influences which are the baser part of capitalism and substitute therefor a passion for human well-being which will have nothing to do with war.[1]

[1] This whole question—the fight for markets, that is, and capitalism as a war-making force—deserves extended and searching treatment. We need to seriously consider all the implications of the competitive organization of industry. No better statement of this can be found anywhere than in the first part of Prof. Roland Usher's "Pan-Americanism." Mr. Usher is a keen-visioned analyst of economic forces and tendencies and if we are to go on doing business as we are doing it now, it is hard to see any escape from such consequences as he anticipates. What are the economists of the future likely to think of statesmen who were not only persuaded that a state

As for the pressure of population upon the limits of subsistence, that is a condition which fighting cannot possibly alter, and which it only complicates. As long as sparsely populated regions are reasonably contiguous to more densely populated areas, there is a brutal kind of logic in fighting for them, but there is no such situation anywhere in Europe. Germany cannot solve her problem of overpopulation by the annexation of Belgium with its denser population, nor by the annexation of northern France, nor by the control of any European territory. All European territories—Russia excepted—are virtually populated to the limit. Indeed, within three generations, all the lands in the temperate zone suitable for colonization by northern races will have begun to feel the pressure of population. What shall we do then? Keep on fighting? That will help nothing. There is only one way in which a weaker race can really be made to give a "place in the sun" to a stronger race, and that is by the extermination of it—an alternative which even the most logical disciple

can grow rich by exporting food while many of its citizens go hungry or by sending out cloth while many of its citizens are in rags, but were actually willing to fight for the chance to do it?

of the gospel of blood and iron would hesitate to accept—at least avowedly.

No, it is time for us to begin to recognize that here also we must depend upon other forces. Fundamentally we must depend upon the tendency of population to accommodate itself automatically to the means of subsistence. Malthus long ago foresaw that this little world of ours cannot support an indefinite increase of population, and however we have cried out against him, we cannot in the end turn the edge of his contention.

France has been the first of the great nations to adjust her population to her territory, and in both England and Germany the birth-rate is falling. Moralists may find this a vexed question, but humanity will sooner or later have to face it. How much it involves cannot easily be said. It means among other things that we shall have to substitute a new care for human fitness for our old careless way of leaving human well-being to the survival of competitive individuals and groups. Any nation which faces a diminishing birth-rate faces also the possibility of national degeneracy unless moral reinforcement, high idealisms and a saving concern for the human stock are brought into action. This I conceive to be at the bottom of our

new emphasis upon eugenics; it means that we are trying to secure fitness, not by reckless over-breeding, bitter competition and the elimination of the unfit, but by a sober concern for the conditions under which the race is propagated, and a new care for our children. If such forces as these can be brought into play—and they must—then we shall have found a way of conserving the physical, moral and spiritual integrity of the race, while at the same time securing a working accommodation between the needs of the living and the limitations of national territory and resources. Along with all this must go, of course, the endeavour to conserve resources, utilize materials, increase the fertility of soils and win for human habitation those parts of our world which for one reason or another are not now fit for habitation.

We have not yet begun to touch the tropics. There are still, between Cancer and Capricorn, vast territories which science and industry combined may make garden spots of the world; we are learning to control tropical diseases and learning how to live in tropical climates. What has been done in Panama can be done, if need be, in the vast valley of the Amazon and the jungles of Africa; but if we are to do it, we cannot

waste our men and our wealth in endless, senseless fighting. What this war costs us in men and money for a single month would go far towards securing such new places for habitation as to give crowded nations the place which they seek in the sun. If men are to die for economic necessities, let them die at least in the brave and well-directed endeavour to meet those necessities, and not in foolish, futile ways which leave us, when it is all over, less able than we were before to do the thing which eventually has to be done. All this will demand, of course, the comradeship of the nations. The disposal of its colonial resources, especially in the tropics, is the most difficult problem which humanity has to solve. If one nation, having come early upon the field and secured the choicest portions of a world which we can never make any bigger, is always to hold them, administer them selfishly and take no thought for the need of her neighbours, we may well despair of enduring peace.

Such considerations as these bring us face to face with what is fundamental in the antagonism of England and Germany to-day. There is much in Germany's attitude which it is difficult for thoughtful men to understand, but this contention of hers that Eng-

land shall not continue to be the world's greatest monopolist without proving her right to hold against all comers, we can at least understand. Is it an impossible dream to suppose that the representatives of the nations may some day come together and consider those portions of our world which are still to be developed and colonized,—not as the monopoly of one or the other of them, but as the common inheritance of humanity to be unitedly administered for the benefit of humanity? We are beginning to recognize the need of this in manifold other instances; we in America are beginning to feel that our forests and mines and other natural resources are the common inheritance of all the children of the Republic, and that they must be so held and so administered even if, for the time being, private interests seem to suffer. Is the extension of such a principle as this into the field of international relationships impossible? Well, it must not be impossible, for it is along this line alone that we shall be able in the end to solve our economic problems. It will be unspeakably difficult to create such attitudes of national coöperation and unselfishness, and it may be that we shall need to be taught in more than one war the real folly of our present way of doing

things, but in the end we must either learn something like this or see our civilizations go out in blood and darkness.

The day that shall challenge the moral reserves of the nations is not so far off as we once dreamed. We can calculate the term of certain things upon which heretofore the well-being of humanity has been vitally dependent; there is so much iron, so much coal, so much nitrogen, so much fertility in the soil, so many square miles in the world; these limits are elastic, but they are not indefinitely elastic; coöperation, and coöperation alone offers the way in which all this may be conserved and made supremely serviceable to the unborn.

War, as the solution of the economic problem, can offer nothing better than a future of increasing bitterness and desperate strife; cooperation offers us a future, not endless indeed, but long enough for widening vistas of hope and imagination, a future filled not with strife but with the wealth-saving and wealth-producing brotherhood of the nations.

II. Once we are able to eliminate the economic causes of war, we shall at least have greatly modified the force of imperialism; but unless the ideals and tempers

of dominant nations are profoundly modified, imperialism will still remain a mischievous and war-making influence. It will be no easy matter to teach the nations self-restraint and a prevailing respect for the individuality and the territory of their neighbours; we shall have to re-define our conceptions of greatness and substitute for the crass and materialistic ideals of militant imperialism the more difficult but vastly greater ideals of ethical, cultural and spiritual supremacy. This will be the task of the poets, the prophets and the publicists of the future. It is passing strange that most nations which have attained an imperial stature have come almost unconsciously to their place of high dominion; then their artists, their poets, their masters of imagination have interpreted to them the significance of what they have done and taught them an imperial self-consciousness. It is not much to say that the Jubilee of Queen Victoria and the poetry of Rudyard Kipling had more to do with kindling the imagination of the English people to a sense of the greatness of their dominion than anything else in their history. If the delusive idealisms of empire are to be displaced by enduring ideals of a truer national greatness, we shall need poets who will sing the

glory of a national life which finds its dominant expressions in peace and brotherhood, in righteousness and even sacrifice, economists who will demonstrate to the peoples the bases of real national well-being, publicists with vision enough to discern the true goals of national life and power enough to lead the people therein, teachers who will make all this real in their interpretation of it and nobly exalt it before the youth whom they guide. Lesser interests may move this or that group in the state, the trader will fight for his gains and the soldier for his trade, but the nation as a whole marches to a nobler music. No war has ever been nobly fought or sacrificially sustained save for causes which have mastered the imaginations of the combatants. Détaille's great mural painting, "Vers la Gloire," which fills with its sweeping wonder the empty spaces of the choir of the Pantheon in Paris reveals the open secret of a world of fighting. We rise to the high level of our visions and die for a dream. We are not now wanting in men who will give a new quality to our dreams. Alfred Noyes, for example, in some of his more glowing verses, has shown us that the poet of a righteous peace may be as splendidly inspired as Kipling and his kind; William Vaughn Moody has

shamed us with his indictment of the "Sounds of Ignoble Battle," and Edwin Markham has taught us how courage and sacrifice are more truly in honest toil than on any battle-field, but such voices must be multiplied. The men on whom such a burden will be laid will find it hard enough to bear. We have only to recall what was said here in America about those who questioned the wisdom of the Republic in her venture in the Philippines, and what was said in England of the "little Englanders" during the Boer War, to see how unreasonably bitter a proud people may become against those who seek to restrain their embattled passion for a greatness which has mastered their imaginations.

Above all, we shall want to hold steadily in view the worth and service of little states, for in the end they have always been richest in the great qualities of life. It is by no accident that those treasures of the spirit which humanity cherishes have been given us by Greece and Judea, Florence and Holland, by little England and little France and even little Germany. A wealthy and arrogant nation consumed by ambition may indeed achieve certain things in the realm of the spirit, and vastly more in material or scientific efficiency and organization; but the very

greatest things have never been rooted in such a soil as this. The world is richer in the individuality of her constituent nations than anything else; whatever absorbs or destroys that individuality impoverishes humanity. Belgium is no great territory, and the life of Belgium has left many things to seek, but the absorption of Belgium in either France or Germany would have left us without a great art, a significant literature, and above all, a noble architecture, in which the lovers of beauty have greatly rejoiced, and the destruction of which is emptying the world of an immemorial splendour which can never be replaced. It is a tremendous spiritual and social programme which is thus outlined, but nothing less than the full achievement of this programme will be sufficient to cut the roots of imperialism; and until militant imperialism is dead the shadow of imminent war will always darken the nations.

III. There is but one cure for the war-making folly of arrogant or ambitious kings and that is democracy. Just as we have seen how all the causes of war interlock, so we are beginning to see, I trust, that the forces which make for the elimination of such causes also interlock. Democracy has been and is

on the whole inimical to imperialism ; a self-governing people do not take kindly to the experiment of governing other peoples without their consent. It is a paradoxical situation which always makes them uneasy. Then the very principles by which they have secured and maintained their own freedom are always challenging them. It will need a deal of editing to make any text-book of American history suitable for use in the Philippines as long as our administration of the Philippines depends upon force and is without the consent of the governed. We should need to leave out the Declaration of Independence, and to expurgate the preamble to the Constitution. The epic of our own war of independence would need to be rewritten. Indeed we should need to be silent about many things which we have long thought to constitute our true glory. Something of this the Republic has long uneasily felt, and we have never been willing to say that we contemplated the permanent continuance of so contradictory a relationship. And if we try to imagine ourselves administering the fortunes of a subject state whose citizens are substantially our own equals in intelligence and moral worth and are our inferiors only in their power to resist aggression, then

we are asked to a "tour de force" of imagination to which some of us at least are not equal. There could only be one of two outcomes to such a situation. Either the basal principles of the Republic would be gradually so modified as to make us no longer truly democratic or else we should be compelled at the bidding of our truer national conscience to grant our neighbours what we claim for ourselves. For such reasons as these democracy and imperialism are incompatible and the extension of the one means the weakening of the other. Moreover the forms and machinery of democratic government do not easily lend themselves to the administration of subject people ; democracies have not been on the whole efficient administrators of colonial enterprises. England is the only possible exception to what I have been saying ; and even here the exception is more apparent than real. Imperial England has been a house divided against itself—not democratic but aristocratic England has been the empire builder, the controller of subject peoples. Democratic England has never taken kindly to this responsibility ; democratic England has felt the implicit contradiction between what she sought to do at home and what she was compelled to do in India. Her finer

services in India, her service of education, that is, and Christianization have complicated her problem of administration. Clear-visioned England has not been able for a good while now to look down the vista of the years in India without apprehensions and forebodings not easy to put in words.

Democracies left to themselves do not take kindly to war: there is no denying that democracies have fought wars a-plenty, but on the other hand they have never gone out to meet them, and have always been willing to make a just and honourable peace when the necessity for war has passed. The wars of democracy have oftener been wars of defense than aggression, and to the glory of democracies it must be said that they and they alone have been brave enough to undertake chivalric wars,—wars, that is, for the defense or liberation of oppressed neighbours. It is the shame of European militarism that until Russia was moved to take sides with Servia not a sword in Europe since the days of republican France has been bared for the sake of the oppressed, the shamed, or the crucified beneath another flag.[1] In every

[1] England's intervention in behalf of Greece in 1827 and in behalf of Bulgaria in 1878 are possible exceptions to so sweeping a statement. But the motives which governed England in 1878 can hardly be called unselfish.

self-governing state those who make war must also fight it and pay for it; and this is in itself a mightily sobering and restraining influence. Democracies are kinder and more neighbourly than aristocracies or autocracies; they answer more quickly to the sense of brotherhood; they incarnate it more perfectly. We here in America have maintained a standing army which may be dismissed as negligible, have reluctantly built a respect-commanding navy, and have on the whole been perhaps too careless of our national defense, not because we are unwilling to pay the price or fight, if need be—there is nothing in our national history to prove that we have been afraid to fight—but because on the whole we have instinctively given expression to the peacemaking, peace-maintaining, peace-trusting forces which are implicit in the life and temper of democracy. And this is our glory.

Republican France, left to herself, would have forgotten her military ideals and ambitions, and even foregone her revenge. In spite of the menace of that cordon of steel which has lain over against her northern frontiers, France was rapidly becoming a peace-loving nation. Another generation without war would have gone far towards transforming her national character.

For such reasons as these, then, we are justified in our confidence that the extension of democracy makes for peace and not for war. The hope of the pacifist in the last thirty years has largely lain in the unhasting and unresting development of democracy in every great nation in the world: those nations in which democracy has been least advanced have been most markedly militant. Any outcome of this present war which would justify the ambitions of the military bureaucracies of the less democratic states would be a kind of world calamity in that it would set back the cause of democracy for at least two or three generations; but the deeper forces which make for democracy will not be so checked; they may be overlain or deflected, but in the end they will have their way; they will override the manifold barriers which are set up against them and will bear upon their broadening tides the peace and brotherhood of the nations.

IV. If we can succeed in eliminating the causes of wars of aggression, we shall of course at the same time eliminate wars of defense. Wars for liberty and national independence, the only wars in which humanity can take any just pride, have always been

forced upon the people who carried them on. The oppressed have always been slow in appealing to the arbitrament of arms and have almost without exception sought to exhaust every means of peaceable settlement before they finally began to fight. No small nation will ever challenge a stronger neighbour without great provocation, and the conservatism of human nature is such that even the sorely tried are reluctant to change existing conditions. We may assume, then, and the whole course of history justifies our assumption, that once we have removed those provocations which for the most part have been resident in imperialism and like national attitudes, wars of resistance will immediately cease. This is so evident that there is no need to dwell upon it at any greater length. In every quarrel some one is usually the aggressor and, everything else being equal, the aggressor is the mischief-maker and should be made to bear the moral responsibility for the quarrel itself. Eliminate injustice, aggression, and ill-judged ambition and the greater part of the world's fighting would be done with, and forever.

V. The gradual development of a more tolerant spirit has made wars of religious

intolerance only an unhappy memory. It would be too much to say that these fires, which upon occasion have flamed up so fiercely, are wholly dead, but we have come to see with reasonable clearness that men of divergent religious beliefs may live and work side by side in friendly fashion, that there is room enough under a generous sky for us all, and above all, that no spiritual interest is ever furthered by carnal weapons, that religion has its own bases and its own power of appeal, and these may be and must be trusted. We have come to see that in the long run error is corrected and truth has its way with men; and we have only to be persistently true to these great persuasions to finish a work already so well begun, and close and seal one bloody chapter of history. In this, as in every other human connection, there is need for a great and intelligently sustained trust in liberty. Mr. Gladstone—in a sentence which statesmen and lawmakers everywhere may well ponder—once said that the fault of all the early part of his political career was an excessive distrust of liberty. An excessive distrust of liberty has fathered many wars and the very excesses of liberty to which a fretful conservatism is always appealing for justification have been

due, almost without exception, to the suspicion and obstruction with which perfectly just demands for necessary reforms were met to begin with.

On the other hand liberty has again and again so splendidly justified itself that we are under bonds to give it room and stead. The temper which seeks to impose its will on the unwilling when there is reasonable room for difference of opinion has much to answer for. The passion to have all men like themselves has made autocracies whether in Church or State hated and hateful. Large-mindedness rejoices in a rich variety of vision and method, sees in liberty the indwelling spirit of the eternal and gladly suffers the shortcoming of those who seek, however imperfectly and even mistakenly, the light for the sake of the light itself. It is thus that truth makes its embattled way. A nation which seeks to impose its culture upon others by force defeats its own endeavour and makes that a curse which might have been a blessing. Napoleon, who at his best represented for a little the militant spirit of the French Revolution, ended by well-nigh undoing the work of the Revolution itself and turning back the clock in Europe for fifty years. All the world was going to school

to Germany till one fateful August day. There are disciplining and conserving forces in any great forward movement which may be trusted to duly restrain those who set up the banners of freedom. That wise old Jew who advised his countrymen to let some wandering evangelists alone since their cause would fail if it deserved to fail and would bear down all opposition if so be God were in it has still much to teach a distraught world.

The highest interests of life are those in which we should first expect real brotherhood to be attained. It has taken almost two thousand years for Christians to learn to live together as friends and forget their differences; and if we have not been as yet conspicuously successful in accomplishing even this, how much longer will it take us to really achieve peace in the more complex and irritating relationships of our social, economic and international life? We are not then to be so easily discouraged if we fail to secure the greater things when we are barely accomplishing the lesser. Jealousy, self-assertion, ambition, the disregard of the rights of others, are old as time; they strike their roots down through all our human nature; they have a kind of cosmic quality; they

are coeval with the beginnings of human life. What we are trying to put in their place is really new come upon the field of history—though it is as old as Christianity—it will need time and still more time and a kind of rebirth of human nature to make it supreme.

VI. Such considerations as these bring us face to face with the need of a nobler philosophy of life if we are to get ourselves clear of war. We saw, as we considered the causes of war, that the great interpenetrating contributing cause of all fighting is a false philosophy of life. We saw that this philosophy has always been implicit in our methods of living together, but that it had been left to our own time to formulate it, idealize it, invest it with passion and exalt it to the level of a national religion. It must be dethroned; it has been false and misleading from the first, pregnant with sorrows and tragedies; it was never falser or more portentous than it is today. Put as simply as possible, this philosophy is of course that when we cannot have our own way, we are to fight for it, and that such fighting is a glorious thing. Its prophets and priests assure us that if we do not fight we shall fall from our high estate.

Fighting, they tell us, is a kind of moral tonic, a method of national salvation, a baptism of blood in which from time to time a nation is to be renewed if it is not to die. There is, as has already been indicated, just truth enough in this to make it terribly dangerous ; and if we are to substitute a nobler philosophy we must take care to disentangle the true and the false. The fallacy of it all is in its blindness to the nobler methods and weapons of warfare. There is a kind of strenuousness in life from which we cannot and ought not to be dismissed. Comfort, ease and prosperity have their own perils. What Professor Peabody calls the soft theory of life possesses a strangely mordant power ; it eats the moral fibre out of the individual and the nation. The modern apologists for war have felt this strongly, and so far they are right. They are wrong only in what they offer as the remedy. It is the fault probably of the interpreters of Christianity that its dominant virtues, gentleness, love, good-will, and the like have been made so invertebrate. They are not invertebrate at all ; they represent in their nobler manifestations the utmost of which humanity is capable and are the very tempered steel of the soul, but we have taken the iron out of them and have so presented

them that they have appealed only to the less virile element in society. We have had an uneasy feeling for a good while that our church life on the whole represented the less positive and forceful aspects of our modern life. There has been an unhappy kind of polarization which has ranged the gentler and more emotional temperaments alongside the apologists for things as they are under the conventional banners of the cross. This has handicapped us sadly in our contentions for peace, and has misled both our friends and our foes: our friends, because neither we nor they have clearly estimated the cost of peace or the virile splendour of the cause to which we are committed; our foes, because it has seemed to them that what we are really afraid of is pain, sacrifice and struggle. The word "pacifist" has become a term of reproach, and even now, when we are having such a demonstration of the havoc of war as has sobered all the world, public opinion as represented by the average American newspaper is still contemptuous of the pacifist and all his works, and dismisses with a phrase a movement the significance of which cannot be overestimated. Why is this? Evidently because we have too largely failed to see that the solution of any question on the very high-

est levels is an immensely more difficult and heroic thing than its solution on lower levels. We fight because fighting is easier than keeping the peace; war is not, as its apologists would tell us, a high and heroic way out of international difficulties; it is the low and indefensible way. It is easier to take arms against a neighbouring people than to sit down around a council table and work out in wisdom and brotherhood and self-restraint the questions which the war involves. The pacifist does not propose to purchase peace half as cheaply as the militarist purchases war. Europe has found it easier to burden the land with her armies and the sea with her ships than resolutely to face and bravely to adjust the difficulties which have been resident in the European situation since the Napoleonic wars, for that means the surrender of fancied rights and arrogant ambitions and possible advantages. It has always been easier to throttle a resolute opponent than to convince him of his mistakes, especially if he happen to be right. It has always been easier to silence those who condemn us than to amend our own lives. It has always been easier to seize the thing we want by force than to surrender it if we have no right to it. When our dusty sanctuaries of tradition are invaded,

we reach for the hammer and the nails, make ready the cross and begin to plait the crown of thorns. The greater heroisms are not resident in the regions where we have always sought them; they lie rather in tempers and attitudes to which we have refused to give place because they demand of us more than we are willing to give. As long as life is what it is and the world is what it is, there is no danger that we shall want occasions for the exercise of the highest courage; but the highest courage will be shown in sacrifice, restraint, humility, gentleness and good-will and in the resolution of difficult situations on the high levels to which these qualities are native. There is absolutely nothing in the moral experience of the race to justify the fears of those who see in the exercise of such qualities as these the possibilities, nay, the certainty of moral deterioration. There is an antiseptic power in noble idealism which we may always trust. The moral fibre of the race will be preserved only as men take their share of that hardness which is implicit in every great moral endeavour, as good soldiers of Jesus Christ. If they do that the future of the race is secure. The world's idealists have never been its degenerates, and they never will be. We have only to follow the history

of any movement which has been begun in protest against injustices and selfishnesses and which has been carried on in a radiant capacity to suffer and endure, to see that here human nature has been most contemptuous of comfort, most splendidly virile in its high and even austere manifestations. The Society of Friends have been the most consistent advocates of peace since war has been under indictment. They have carried their advocacy of it to extremes. If Bernhardi's philosophy be true, they should be moral degenerates, cowardly and ease-loving : as a matter of fact they have supplied perhaps the finest strain in our English and American inheritance. They have been rich in the great qualities of an ordered and temperate life, and their children, though they have not always clung to the forms of their fathers' faith, have been uniformly men and women of power, poise and influence. They have been saved by the greatness of the ideal to which they have devoted themselves.

However we may differ as to the wisdom of turning the other cheek, we must agree that it takes a braver man to turn the other cheek when he does it as a matter of principle, than to strike back. Here, I am persuaded, is the true answer to Bernhardi and

his kind. All that they seek in discipline and devotion to militant ideals can be more truly attained as the nations address themselves to the ideals of a peace which is not the cowardly or complacent acceptance of things as they are, but the resolute endeavour to make things what they ought to be.

The moralists, statesmen, poets and prophets who will highly exalt all this and enthrone it in the imagination of the nations, and make it dominant in their idealisms will secure for courage new definitions, robe honour in new garments, mightily declare the splendour of sacrifice and make plain to us all the purifying and saving power of the ethical and the spiritual.

Do we seek discipline? What finer manifestation of it can there be than the self-restraint of a great justice-loving people in the face of the provocations of ambition and arrogance? Will the nations show the stuff of which they are made? Let them declare it in the consideration with which they treat their weaker neighbours, in the long-suffering and redemptive patience which they display towards the hasty and misguided. Do they seek to impress the world with the might of their national spirit? Let them do that by surrendering opportunities of national ag-

grandizement for the sake of the well-being of the brotherhood of the nations.

These are the qualities which lift themselves like changeless mountain summits above the murk and clamour of our lives; these are the lights which lie like a benediction across the centuries, undimmed and unforgotten. In such ways as these states are made glorious. The remembrance of injustice festers in the consciousness of the peoples an open wound unhealed from generation to generation. Arrogance and ambition become the hateful legacy of children's children. When great historians, who more truly than any others make articulate the voice of God in the judgment of human affairs, cast up from time to time the accounts of His world, intemperate strength is condemned, inconsiderate pride is shown for what it is, and all the future is taught to hate the arrogance and injustice of the past. But these greater qualities of a nation's life—justice, charity, fair dealing, self-restraint—are seen to have been the true manifestation of its worth, the vindication of its ambition and ideals. They dwell forever in the memory and veneration of men, saving the nations which have made them manifest from the touch of oblivion, and justifying our pride in our kind.

There is no nobler task awaiting those who have conviction, vision and capacity than the promulgation of such a philosophy of national life as this. It is glowing enough to command the imagination of youth, the truth of it will secure the assent of the wise and thoughtful, the fruit of it will be the peace of the nations. There is challenge enough in it to evoke a splendid courage; there is difficulty enough in the carrying through of the programme which it suggests to bring into action the disciplined enthusiasm of a nation, and the full expression of it is so manifold as to offer a place for what the poet has to sing, the prophet to hope for, the preacher to proclaim, and the statesman to build into law.

VII. There remains only to consider the ways in which militarism as the concrete expression of the militaristic philosophy of life may itself be eliminated. Militarism is a result as much as a cause of the conditions we are seeking to change; it is created by such forces as we have already been considering; as they cease to come into action, militarism itself will largely wither away. There is much in it which is so antagonistic to the better tendencies of our present life that

under any circumstances the stars in their courses are fighting against it. Democracy is antagonistic to militarism, not only because the deeper instincts of democracy are peaceful, but because democracy does not take kindly to the social distinctions which militarism always brings with it. Democracy is savingly jealous of officialdom and all its works. Part of the military inefficiency of democracies is due to the fact that they persist in keeping the control of the army in the hands of civilians; that is, in the hands of the State; democracy feels instinctively the possible menace of a great standing army to the integrity of its own institutions. Modern industrial life and militarism are incompatible. Militarism means the withdrawal of a great number of men from the productive life of the State; they have to be carried by the workers of the State, and since these workers have substantially all that they can do to meet their own necessities and commonly do that meagrely enough, they do not relish having the soldier added to their burdens. I know that there are some things to be said on the other side; the defense of the State is an asset as well as a liability, and the German apologists for universal conscription claim with some show of reason that the discipline

of military training makes a man a better workman. But allowing for all this, industry and militarism are competitive forces in the State, and economic necessities are likely to create increasingly a public opinion more and more hostile to great armaments.

Above all, once we have established the truer philosophy which we have been considering, militarism will find itself in an alien atmosphere and be so hard put to it for argument as to be unable to sustain itself in the face of an increasingly critical public opinion.

So much for the forces which will indirectly correct the situation which we deplore, but, apart from all this, militarism must be dealt with directly. Whether or no we shall be able to secure universal disarmament in the near future is wholly problematical; in the light of the past the chances are against it. It is not likely that any nation will as yet consent to put itself wholly at the mercy of its neighbours; nor is it likely that we shall speedily create a force of international public opinion strong enough to wholly modify a situation so deeply established in the temper and traditions of the modern world. I doubt whether we pacifists here in America would be wise in counselling the nation to neglect

the proper precautions for its own defense, especially in the maintenance of the navy, but there are two or three things upon which we can and ought to unite. First of all, the State should become responsible for the manufacture of its own guns, men-of-war, arms and munitions. The element of private gain should be eliminated.[1] We shall never know

[1] There are telling arguments on both sides of this proposition. Those who do not accept it urge that modern warfare demands such a quantity of munitions that the State cannot wholly supply them without either an excessive development of state establishments or else such an excessive accumulation of armament and supplies as would make a proud people restless and menacing. They urge also international traffic in arms because weaker nations are otherwise put at the mercy of the stronger and more militant. But that is true under any conditions, and our experience here in America in meeting the European demand for munitions has shown that general manufacturing plants cannot really begin to produce even small arms and ammunition in any considerable quantity much under a year. And even a month's delay may be fatal. We have, therefore, but one of two alternatives. Either great private establishments wholly devoted to making arms and ammunition or state plants. Private plants must be kept in operation for they must pay dividends or they cannot either secure working capital or maintain their organization. They will, therefore, automatically find or make markets for their wares. This is what the Krupps have done. It is not too much to say that the Essen establishment has been an international menace for a long generation. It has armed the nations—and yet as there seems good reason for believing—it has armed the possible foes of the Fatherland with the less effective guns. The whole situation is indefensible by the standards of even a war-defending morality, and yet the hateful logic of it is unescapable.

The State can at least afford to let its plant be idle from

what part the lobbyist has in keeping up agitation for excessive armament, but no one doubts that his influence has been real and malign. If the State allows the establishment and growth of manufacturing plants representing great investments and employing great numbers of men for the production of war material, then it is inevitable that their proprietors will use all their influence direct and indirect to keep themselves going. They will be able to exert a greater influence in a democracy than anywhere else, although recent German experience has shown that even in a state rigidly and purely governed, it is almost impossible to prevent dishonest alliances between the gun-makers and the military authorities. It has long been charged that the Russian military administration is worm-eaten with graft. The army contractor is a parasite in times of war, and a constant source of corruption in times of peace. Whatever else we do or leave undone, he should be eliminated.

time to time for it does not need to pay dividends. Moreover of the two evils—the equivalent of a Krupp plant in each nation or an adequate store of such munitions as do not deteriorate accumulated against a day of possible need—the latter is the lesser evil. On the whole the preponderance of argument from the pacifist point of view is for the state control and manufacture of armament.

In the next place, there will probably be an opportunity at the end of this present war for the limitation of armament. The financial necessities of the European nations will make them vastly more amenable to argument along this line than they have heretofore been. The Kaiser is quoted as saying that he knew no formula for national disarmament. Financial bankruptcy will possibly supply that formula. We are not to underestimate the difficulties in securing such an agreement; the practical difficulty of course will be in determining the standard of maximum armament. Perhaps the English suggestion of a "naval holiday" and its equivalent in the other arm of the service will be the most feasible way out. If the nations cannot be brought to agree to universal disarmament, if they find it difficult to agree about a maximum standard, perhaps they will at least be willing to agree to limit the increase of armament for a term of years: this will permit restraining and peacemaking forces to come more fully into action.

The nations which believe most consistently in peace and are willing to do most to secure it, must set an example to the others. The time has come when we must be willing to take a risk for the sake of peace; something

must always be ventured in every great cause. It has always been the glory of humanity that individuals have been willing to risk much—their lives, if need be, for the better day whose dawning they foresaw. Why should a nation try to escape this law? If we cannot secure a public opinion which will dare something for the sake of a cause so holy, we shall never secure its triumph.

Not long ago, John Henry Jowett electrified a great congregation by saying that God may require a nation to die for peace before the world secures it; however this may be, the whole weltering misery of the world makes it manifest as it has never been manifest before that it is the holy task of every nation, which does not wish the repetition of the tragedy which has darkened all our skies, to venture something for peace. This means restraint in the matter of armament, even in the face of an armed and hostile world, the capacity to endure serious affronts without issuing ultimatums and above all an unswerving dependence upon justice and fair dealing. Every nation that throws itself boldly upon justice and right dealing for its defense secures thereby an immense and immediate reinforcement, the reinforcement of what Bismarck, who was certainly not a senti-

mentalist, called the "imponderables." We need to remember that others recognize the force of such an attitude as well as ourselves. The military spirit in every nation is kept alive, in part at least, by the hostile attitude of its neighbour. It is doubtful whether even the most arrogant militarism would not be directly modified if the ring of iron by which it is surrounded were withdrawn. If Russia, England and France were to take away from Germany the occasion and excuse of her own military spirit by sending their armies back to the field and workshop and dismantling their frontier fortresses, Germany might find herself in so indefensible a position that in answer to necessities inevitable as gravitation her own militarism would begin to disintegrate, and the forbearance of her neighbours secure what their massed forces are likely to find it tremendously hard to accomplish.

We are just beginning to consider the psychology of armament; we have not yet begun to take seriously the psychology of disarmament. The individual finds it hard to be truculent in a society where men for the most part are going peaceably about their own business. The power of conformity operates here as everywhere else; the private

citizen armed to the teeth in a social world where other men who are not similarly armed only makes himself ridiculous. Don Quixote riding abroad when all men are clad in mail is a noble and even fitting figure; but Don Quixote riding abroad so accoutred in an age when armour is relegated to museums would be considered either as an escaped lunatic or as one lost from a Lord-Mayor's Show. An armed nation in a peaceful world would eventually lend itself to the satire of a new Cervantes and be laughed off the stage of history.

Here then are four of the ways in which militarism ought to be dealt with: first, the element of private gain should be eliminated from war and war-making; second, limitation of armament should constantly and consistently be sought; third, the nations which really believe in peace and really trust pacific methods are under bonds to take some risks for the sake of peace; and lastly, universal disarmament should be held steadfastly in view as an ideal always to be sought, even though we are far enough from the day of its realization.

If we are ever to be done with war, the nations must learn to forgive and forget. Nothing which has been heretofore suggested in

the programme of elimination is more difficult than this. The memory of the peoples is unspeakably tenacious. Misunderstandings between individuals die with the individual, but the very deathlessness of the State dowers its loves and hates with a like immortality. Even the most impartial historian will give to his recital of ancient wrongs a kindling quality and the hearts of those who read will glow again with fires which were lit a century before. Not until well within our own time have France and England come to look upon one another with any kind of friendliness. The jealousies and injustices of five centuries of mutual aggression have not been easy to forget. Indeed they have learned forgetfulness only in the face of a danger which involved them both. Estrangements growing out of the Cromwellian wars still live in England herself, and the tension between Germany and France is rooted in mediæval conditions and has been watered with blood in every conflict between France and Germany from the wars of Louis XIV till this present war. Indeed the most portentous thing about the fighting to-day is that it carries within itself the possibility of endless future fighting. If accounts like these are to be carried from page to page of history, how shall they ever be

closed? If forgiveness and forgetfulness on the part of the individual are virtues to be rejoiced in, are they any less worthy in the life of a nation? If pride and bitterness work havoc as between individual and individual, are they any less mischief-makers between state and state? It is possible for the estrangements born of war to be overcome. We know that here in America; we have, within a half century, substantially outlived the unhappy inheritances of the Civil War and are a united people. Nay, we have done more than that. We have gathered together on our greatest battlefield the men who made that field glorious by their valour. Those who held the Bloody Angle at Gettysburg and those who stormed it met as comrades a half a century after those great July days, not indeed to ignore the past, but to transmute all the better, braver part of it into a wealth of common association where each was made rich in the courage of the other, and each found in what the other had done a testimony to what he himself had endured. And all this was made possible because the clearer visioned men, North and South alike, saw that since we were to live together under one flag, we must live together as brethren. We therefore

sought reconciliation and we have achieved it. We could have easily perpetuated the bitterness and estrangements of the Civil War and the decades immediately preceding it,—we have not been wanting in men who seemed to make it their hateful mission to do just that—but had we done so, there would have been no hope for the Republic. We do not feel that we have done unworthily in doing what we have done. We see in it rather an accomplishment so signal that the future will account it near the greatest achievement of our country.

What we have done as between ourselves is surely possible for other nations. Even now England and France may meet at Waterloo around the lion which commemorates the triumph of the allied forces, or the stricken eagle which commemorates the dauntlessness of the Grand Army of the Empire, and so meeting may find no roots of future bitterness, but only a might of healing reconciliation born of common courage and common sacrifice. Will the day never come when the French and the Germans may so gather upon the fields of Sedan? All this means, I repeat, that we must give new place and new emphasis to all those forces which heal and reconcile, that we must ex-

alt forgiveness and find a place for a great charity in our dealing with one another as nations.

International peace demands also the redefinition of certain great national ideals. It is altogether fitting and proper that a nation should cherish its honour beyond its own life, but we need to recognize at the same time that honour can never be anything other than a deathless devotion to the very best. We have, hitherto, too largely identified honour with combativeness. May it not be equally identified with forbearance and long-suffering? May it not be a greater honour to make peace than to make war? How can honour more splendidly reveal and vindicate itself than in holding fast at any cost to those great ends in which the well-being of humanity is to be secured? Honour, we say, cannot be arbitrated, and the truth of that is, I suppose, that each one of us in great extremities has to choose for himself, and in so choosing, more nearly unveils his holy of holies than in any other act of life, but if honour cannot be arbitrated, it may none the less be our honour to arbitrate; if we cannot be compelled to permit others to decide for us, it may nevertheless be the very essence of our honour that we take counsel

with others in our deliberations. Each nation has its Shekinah, its place of meeting with the unseen and the eternal. Here our last high ideals, our ultimate definitions of value, our sense of supreme national worth, are exalted to the level of religion itself. For reasons historical and psychological, we have hitherto too largely tested a nation's passion for these ideals by its quick willingness to draw the sword. We may equally test the sacrificial passion of a nation by its willingness to keep the sword in its scabbard in the face of sore provocation. An honour so made manifest will appeal to the honour of the adversary and release, it may be, forces all overlain and deflected but never wholly perished, forces which will meet justice with justice, forbearance with forbearance, and a generously expressed confidence with an even more generous determination to be worthy of a trust so made manifest. Honour so conceived and so sustained will be seen when the accounts of history are cast up to have a glory all its own and to deserve an approbation which Christian nations seem strangely slow in seeking. "Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God."

III

PEACEMAKING FORCES AND THEIR MOBILIZATION

I HAVE now nearly completed the discussion of the thesis to which this essay is devoted. That thesis includes two propositions: first, that arbitration, international tribunals and treatises intended to control the conduct of nations in times of international stress do not guarantee peace; second, that peace can be secured only by the gradual elimination of the causes of war. In the development of the thesis I have sought to discover what these fundamental causes of war are and to indicate the methods by which they are to be eliminated. The massiveness of this task is clearly manifest; it means nothing less than generations, it may be, of moral, social and spiritual sanitation; it involves the reconstitution of age-old situations, the reconstitution of the very soil in which the life of the nations roots itself; it anticipates the triumphant achievement of the most difficult task which humanity faces. Its fulfillment will be the radiant vindication of the

holiest hopes which call us across the heights of time.

What instruments are sufficient for a work like this? What forces have we which we may organize, mobilize and send out to such an holy war? In a sentence, we have only our moral idealism to depend upon. If this seems a vague answer to a grave question, we need to remember that idealisms of some sort lie at the basis of all human endeavour; they may be clearly conceived or shadowly apprehended; they may indeed never be apprehended at all by masses of men who, none the less, move in answer to their driving power. But whether we serve them gladly and willingly or move in dumb response to forces which we neither define nor recognize, somewhere at the heart of every epoch determining conceptions have been resident which have given form and colour to every aspect of its life. Distinctive periods of history grow old or cease to be as their fundamental idealisms are altered; new epochs are born in answer to the spiritual travail of the centuries. The altering face of the world, whether in cities or industries or governments, is but the revelation of the gestation of changing ideas in the mighty womb of time. What has been will be: we shall remake our

world only as we remake its ideals. What we really idealize we are pretty sure to attain. It does not greatly matter how important or how far-reaching the questions involved, they will still be determined, as all things great and small are determined, by the power and quality of our human desire. What we really want, not what we say we want, but what we really want, we are very likely in the end to secure. The power of our desire makes us hospitable to every suggestion that works towards its attainment. Desires minimize difficulties, discover roads towards longed-for goals across the roughest kind of country, mobilize quickly, keep their forces long in action, call up unexpected reinforcements, undergo passing defeat without discouragement and rise afresh from the fields of seeming defeat. Only a truly peace-loving world will ever become peaceful; as long as the ideals of peace are doubtfully or disloyally held, as long as they lie only upon the surface of our lives—professed, it may be, in those creeds which we keep for public exhibition, but denied in those secret documents of the soul by which we really order our conduct—so long as this is true we shall always be crying Peace, peace, when there is no peace, and professing ourselves its advocates

when we are really all the while holding its ideals only with such reservations as make their true attainment impossible.

The first great contemporaneous task of the peacemakers, then, is so to establish restraining peace-loving ideals as to give them a real and a popular power which they have not heretofore possessed. This will be the task of the prophets and apostles of peace. Ideals are communicated from soul to soul; they are, to begin with, the peculiar possession of a few to whom God has granted the open vision, and whom He has so made the heralds of an ampler dawn. These pioneers of a high enterprise are likely, first of all, to be lonely and misunderstood. They are fortunate indeed if they are heard at all; too often they have been silenced, and the best and bravest of them will count their life's work well done if they have kindled in a few lives the fire of their prevailing passion, or have caused only a chosen few here and there to hear and to heed the call of better things.

But, in the end, such idealists have always had their way with us, if so be their ideals were right and true. Their passion communicates itself from soul to soul; their conceptions come, in the end, to master and control the imaginations of men: they secure

through the generations a new alignment of forces that finally call into action practical instrumentalities which write their ideals into constitutions, and build up their dreams into the framework of the states.

The middle process in every great campaign of idealism is always education. For idealism has three movements: there is, first, the day of its lonely proclamation, when the thing sought for has no dwelling-place but the hospitable spirits of the chosen few who are instant in season and out of season in proclaiming the truth which has possessed them—themselves a "Voice and nothing else." The second period in the realization of any great ideal is the period of education; then the ideal must come down out of the sky and begin to walk abroad among men with its feet upon the earth. It must prove its right to be—justify itself by facts and conditions, appealing not to the imagination or to glowing moral passions, but to the reason of men, advancing itself by such arguments as cannot be gainsaid, and commending itself even to the most skeptical, not only by the righteous but also the reasonable power of its appeal. The third period is the period of its organic expression in institutions, laws and manners. The ideal of international peace is

still in the second stage, and our greatest fault heretofore has been that the more sanguine and confident among us have outrun the real progress of the thing which we have been championing; we have supposed our ideal to have won for itself a place in the reasoned judgment of men which is really not yet gained. In our strong feeling against war and our equally strong feeling for peace, we have been most concerned with the very last phase of it,—its organization into international law and procedure. And meanwhile, our propaganda has been wanting in that deciding force which every great cause gains from the mature and strongly held conviction of those who really make and express public opinion. I conceive that international peace is still more largely dependent upon the educational processes than we have supposed; and since education always takes a long time, and demands a vast deal of patience, so those who are urging international peace must not attempt too quickly to try to gather in the fruit of what they have been doing.

"Others, I doubt not, if not we,
The issues of our toil shall see,
And they forgotten and unknown,—
Young children gather as their own
The harvests which the dead have sown."

It is one of the characteristics of our own time that we are wanting to get in the harvests, sometimes, before we have fully prepared the soil for the sowing of their seed. On the other hand it must be said that the experience which the world is just now undergoing will be likely to shorten the processes of education, and bring quickly to a head a growth of public opinion which otherwise might be long in maturing. The reasons which the pacifists have been trying to drive home are being illustrated with such terrible vividness that even the blindest of us may read as we run. What our own generation could not be taught through perhaps thirty years of propaganda they are learning in a day. Still we are far from the time when education along this line shall have done its perfect work. We shall be needing to utilize every instrument of public opinion to bring home to men the unreasonableness of war, and the bright reasonableness of peace.

Literature, art, the school, the college, the university, the church centrally and unceasingly, the newspaper, the political campaigner, the publicist, the legislator, the statesman, the philosopher—all must join in this campaign of education. And indeed it is likely that more will be done by educa-

tional forces which seem rather indirect than by those which deal most immediately with the vital questions of war and peace. Here art and poetry can be of great service. Surely there is some deep-seated connection between the age-old glorification of war in European art and the martial spirit of Europe. Every great European gallery is lined with pictures of battles. The glorification of war at the hands of great artists has been such as to capture and direct the imagination of the generations. The soldier in his accoutrements of war, in some moment of unforgettable daring, or in some high and glorious instant of victory, has been so held before us as to fill all the foregrounds of our love of power and courage. Marbles and bronzes perpetuate his memory. Great triumphal arches inscribed with his name and the names of his battles continually retell his story to the awestruck and adoring. The poet has made him deathless. The State, in her gratitude, has remembered the soldier above all the rest of her children. No wonder, then, that what he stands for has laid hold of our imagination, and whatever masters the imagination masters the man.

It is significant that France, richest of all the nations in her martial memories and

richest of all the nations, too, in the great monuments which perpetuate her martial traditions, and in the great pictures which appeal to the quick and glowing temper of her sons—it is significant that this France, I say, has within the last ten years asked her sculptors and artists to glorify, as only sculptors and artists can, the occupations of peace. The leaders of the Republic were hoping, and wisely hoping, to teach the children of France the glory of the courage that reveals itself in self-constraint and service and lives as splendidly for the commonwealth as the soldier has known how to die. So Meunier, through his marbles and bronzes in Brussels, has made a beginning of glorifying the toiler. Those austere figures of his, sweating and straining in the mine and at the forge, are nobly prophetic of the time when the men who do the world's work shall come to their own, and be seen as they ought to be seen—soldiers of the common good. So the husbandmen and toiling women of Jean François Millet seen through twilights which are forever darkening and forever glowing are invested with so moving a pathos that we see them for what they are —unconsidered soldiers of the common good enrolled by dumb heroisms old as toil. It is

not enough to make war hateful through art, as Vereschagin has done. Peace and toil and brotherhood must be made splendid through the same glowing medium.

The peace propaganda of the future must of course appeal to prudential considerations; the cost of war must be steadily held before us. There is neither need nor occasion in so brief a study as this to recapitulate the long tables of statistics which are available—tables which are fairly staggering in their cumulative conclusions, which lengthen with every day of this weary fighting, and which reveal to us the open secret of the poverty of a world which ought to be so rich. But no nation has ever been kept from war by merely prudential considerations; that is our glory and not our shame. If Belgium had been governed merely by prudential considerations she would have been given the right of way to the German forces, accepted at the most some millions of marks in recompense, and gone about her business smug, shamed and contented. Because she did not count the cost she lies mangled and appealing beneath the wintry sky, the blood of her slain finding tongue, a martyred people.

So in our campaign of education we must

dwell strongly upon those costs of war which are not so easy to tabulate. The spiritual appeal of war—for war has its spiritual appeal—must be met by considerations equally high, passionate and unselfish. If war is born in perverted and inadequate idealisms it must be overborne by nobler idealisms. Its cost to the high things of the spirit must be clearly and ceaselessly urged. And we shall not want for material here. We are to teach our children that war costs the world the chance of better living and bears with greatest weight upon those whose lot is already so unhappy as to appeal to all who love their fellow men.

War costs the world its rarest inheritance. It respects neither cathedrals nor universities nor libraries nor any expression of creative genius, no matter how precious or how hallowed. Historic monuments, rich in great associations, beautiful through art and devotion, built by a craftsmanship which the world has forever lost, and therefore never to be rebuilt in their rare and ancient fashion, are to-day a mass of ruins. In our insensate fightings we have always been destroying the past; there is little that is either beautiful or gracious or priceless in association which has come down to us through the centuries un-

scarred by war; and what we possess is only a fraction of what we might have possessed.

Time and the passing seasons are kind to the work of our hands; at the most the years do but soften the glowing colours of great canvases, deepen the shadows of bronzes, or etch with a kindly magic the gray carvings of great cathedrals. It is man and man alone who undoes the work of the master builders, and passes on to the unborn but shattered torsos of the sculptors' masterpieces and broken arches of the builders' achievement? We can count upon the permanence of nothing precious and beautiful if we are always to be making it the sport or the prize of war.

War costs us our confidence in the integrity of diplomats, and the good faith of the nations; it costs us our most deep-held and invaluable ideals. Despair, cynicism, the exaltation of force, the sheer denial of the power of love and justice and goodness are the unescapable price of endless fighting. War costs us our faith in God. If we are always to fight, there are great hopes and confidences —our very greatest—which we may well immediately and forever dismiss. "Why should we hold them?" we say, "if they are to be always failing us? Jesus was only a Galilean dreamer; the Cross is the idlest symbol

in the world; the brotherhood of man a delusion, the fatherhood of God the baseless affirmation of those who are blind to facts."

If there be no hope of escape from war, then Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardi are wiser than the prophets and the poets; they are wiser than Christian statesmen; wiser than Jesus Christ. They ask us to cast aside what is nearest divine in the hearts of men—the expectation of all that justifies the creative travail of God, our long-held anticipation of a better world.

As I have sought to indicate more than once before, the friends of peace in their campaigns of education and their idealizations of a nobler order must always distinguish between war and those great qualities of the human spirit which seek thus to express themselves; courage, sacrifice, the subordination of the interests of the individual to the well-being of the State are so precious that we should impoverish the world were we to exalt a world state in which they should be wanting. War is hateful not because it spells death and loss and suffering, but because it so pitifully expresses the rare and deathless qualities of the soul and so completely fails to furnish any real solution of the problems to which it addresses itself. Long ago

Sebastian Castellio, pleading for toleration in the bloody times of the Reformation, in a preface addressed to the Duke of Wurtemburg, exposed in a single paragraph the fallacy of force in the determination of spiritual issues. "If thou, illustrious Prince, had informed thy subjects that thou wert coming to visit them at an unnamed time and had requested them to be prepared in white garments to meet thee on thy coming; what wouldst thou do, if on arrival thou shouldst find that instead of robing themselves in white they had occupied themselves in violent debate about thy person—some insisting that thou wert in France, others that thou wert in Spain; some declaring that thou would come on horseback, others that thou would come by chariot; some holding that thou would come with great pomp, others that thou would come without train or following? And what especially wouldst thou say if they debated not only with words but with blows of fist and strokes of sword, and if some succeeded in killing and destroying others who differed from them? 'He will come on horseback.' 'No, he won't; he will come by chariot.' 'You lie.' 'No, I do not; you are the liar.' 'Take *that*'—a blow with the fist. 'You take *that*'—a sword-thrust through the

body. O Prince, what would you think of such citizens?" And he adds a single line which is absolutely final, whether the question in issue be of the authority of the Church, the truth of a doctrine or the settlement of a great issue in debate between nations. "To burn a man is not to defend a doctrine, it is *to burn a man!*"

To kill a man is not to settle any question which has ever divided the peoples: it is *to kill a man!* Here is the fallacy of war; it gives to courage an inadequate expression; it calls sacrifice from the high fields of its true employment. In the name of discipline it releases the forces of anarchy; it is always the less brave way, it is always the easier way, it is always falsifying its own high pretension; it is eternally incompatible with a true humanity; it gives the lie to friendship and brotherliness; it affronts reason and shames justice, for it proclaims its high distrust of them both. The education of the future must hold this clearly, patiently, ceaselessly in view. Those who urge such arguments as these will in the end prevail, for these arguments are incontrovertible. They have for their allies our holiest instincts; they face towards the one future towards which we dare to look with any brave or comforting vision.

A programme like this will take a long time to realize; it will not be easy to secure the supremacy of those ideals which will commit the nations with any substantial unanimity to a real endeavour for peace. Even after such a force of international public opinion has been secured, it will be long before it can express itself in policies, diplomatic traditions, the healing of estrangements, the relaxing of tensions and the thoroughgoing solution of fundamental problems. Meanwhile new causes of war are likely to come into being; the friends of peace therefore cannot and ought not to trust to the operation of such influences alone. The world needs, therefore, an "interim" programme—a machinery of adjustment and reconciliation which shall be constantly in action, while the deeper forces which remake the world are about their difficult and long continued task. Here is where arbitration, international tribunals and restraining treaties and understandings must come into play. Even the most hopeless idealist cannot easily anticipate the time when there shall be no need of such mediating agencies; their usefulness and their necessity are both beyond debate. The only thing which this monograph questions is their sufficiency for the

task to which they address themselves if they be not reinforced by the elimination, as that can be secured, of the war-making forces. A secure and final peace depends upon our securing a world less fertile in hostilities and misunderstandings than the world in which we live. But if we are to be saved from endless unnecessary fightings, while we are trying to do that, we are under bonds to secure some better way of adjusting differences already in existence or likely again and again to embitter the nations, than the arbitrament of arms.

We are still far from the time when we may dismiss force as a necessary element in the life of the city or the nation; we are farther still from the time when any reasonable man would feel secure in a world whose high tribunals had no way of backing up and enforcing their decrees. It is possible to imagine a city whose police should be only the friendly counsellors of strangers and the directors of traffic. But we are still far enough from such cities, though all the better social forces are working for their attainment. The world will still need its police, and that means an international armament serving at the bidding of an international tribunal backed up by international sentiment but always in

the way of being superseded by the creation of such forces of brotherhood and mutual consideration as shall make the exercise of it increasingly unnecessary.[1]

[1] I have not sought in this essay to consider at all exhaustively what I have ventured to call an "interim programme." Very likely such a programme must not be thought of as temporary. We ought to look forward to an international tribunal of some sort as a permanent addition to the governmental forces of the world. But even so we must still be fundamentally dependent for peace upon the operation of such forces as tend to create identity of interests between the nations and upon the self-restraint of the nations in periods of tension. Our Supreme Court furnishes a suggestive analogy. It is invaluable in adjudging differences between the States of the Union but the real unity of the Republic is created and maintained by forces ot an entirely different character.

At any rate, such proposals as are here crowded into a paragraph or two are now so much dwelt upon and elaborated on by the friends of peace everywhere that there is little need to do more than recognize them in this connection. It seems to the writer, however, that an international police controlled from the Hague is by no means so simple as it seems. Substantial disarmament must first be secured, and we are a long ways from that. Until then it would open a door by which the old alliances and ententes which have so long plagued Europe would come in under other guises and would in all likelihood afford the occasion for a European or even a world "war of secession" to the character of which this present war offers an arresting testimony. The same considerations ought to sober the advocates of the league of peace—a programme which has taken shape since this was written. Those who are shaping that programme underestimate the difficulties in the way of the forcible achievement of peace. Germany, whether defeated or triumphant, and Russia are the two major nations most likely in the future to offer an occasion for such benevolent coercion. The attempt to coerce either of them would demand

With such an ideal as this, based upon national policies which seek the defensible ends of national life in the unity of the peoples, every true lover of peace may be content, and with nothing less than this. No force which really looks towards such a consummation is too small to be utilized or too great to be adventured. The individual need not be disheartened because he counts for so little, or dismayed because his task is so great, or cast down because the triumph of what he seeks is so long in coming and his expectations so often seemingly defeated. He has nothing to do save to follow the gleam. The friends of peace will need to recognize that peace fulfills itself in many ways; it has heretofore more than once availed itself even of the sword, and struggled towards its appointed goals through the smoke of battle. It may still have to fight for its life, and we

a greater degree of military preparedness on the part of the rest of the world than we have had even for the last generation. An international police big enough to coerce either the Teutonic or Slavic peoples would strain the resources of occidental civilization, and to call such a police into action would be to mobilize for another world war. The real value of all such programmes will be finally seen to be moral and psychological. They will create the peace habit of mind, spread abroad the expectation of peace, and train the nations to think in terms of peace. And they will do this the more effectually as they rely the more unswervedly upon purely pacific measures.

who love and seek it will keep an open mind and seek only to discern the splendour of its dawning through whatever cloud and darkness it arises. In the hastening of the New Day an important part will fall to the Christian Church.

No institution in the world is so committed to the cause of peace by its creeds, its implications, its ideals and the very necessities of life as the Church. It was born in the prophecy of peace, it is the keeper of the gospel of peace, it belongs by divine right and divine obligation to the fellowship of those of whom it was long ago said, "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him who bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that sayeth unto Zion, Thy God reigneth." This is the charter of the Church, and if she fails here she will not be able to justify herself anywhere else. No part of the Christian Church is so dedicated to the cause of peace as the Church of Christ in America. America is the mediatorial nation; by the providence of God in history she has been set apart both in spirit and station from those controversies in which the world has grown sadly old. She has gathered together under her flag the children of many people and taught them the secret of a new brotherhood; she is strong enough to

make her voice heard in the councils of the world, unselfish enough to win the respect of those who will not listen to their neighbours, idealistic enough to lead humanity in the venture of peace. At the heart of our American life is the American Church ; free from entangling alliances with the State and its parties, with no cause to serve save the causes of ultimate justice and regnant righteousness. She would be false not only to the common inheritances of the Church of Christ as a whole, but to her new birth on American soil, did she not proclaim in season and out of season the Lordship of the Prince of Peace. She could lose her life to find it again in no holier cause ; she has leadership, power, influence to feed into the life of this nation an idealism which shall cast its light far down the future's broadening way and make plain the path along which the peoples shall come.

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